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Abstract 
 
We usually portray the early modern period as one characterised by the ‘birth 
of subjectivity’ with Luther and Descartes as two alternate representatives of 
this radical break with the past, each ushering in the new era in which ‘I’ am 
the locus of judgements about the world. A sub-narrative called ‘the mind-
body problem’ recounts how Cartesian dualism, responding to the new 
promise of a mechanistic science of nature, “split off” the world of the 
soul/mind/self from the world of extended, physical substance – a split 
which has preoccupied the philosophy of mind up until the present day. We 
would like to call attention to a different constellation of texts – neither a 
robust ‘tradition’ nor an isolated ‘episode’, somewhere in between – which 
have in common their indebtedness to, and promotion of an embodied, 
Epicurean approach to the soul. These texts follow the evocative hint given in 
Lucretius’ De rerum natura that ‘the soul is to the body as scent is to incense’ 
(in an anonymous early modern French version). They neither assert the 
autonomy of the soul, nor the dualism of body and soul, nor again a sheer 
physicalism in which ‘intentional’ properties are reduced to the basic 
properties of matter. Rather, to borrow the title of one of these treatises (L’âme 
matérielle), they seek to articulate the concept of a material soul. We reconstruct 
the intellectual development of a corporeal, mortal and ultimately material 
soul, in between medicine, natural philosophy and metaphysics, including 
discussions of Malebranche and Willis, but focusing primarily on texts 
including the 1675 Discours anatomiques by the Epicurean physician Guillaume 
Lamy; the anonymous manuscript from circa 1725 entitled L’âme matérielle, 
which is essentially a compendium of texts from the later seventeenth century 
(Malebranche, Bayle) along with excerpts from Lucretius; and materialist 
writings such Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s L’Homme-Machine (1748), in order 
to articulate this concept of a ‘material soul’ with its implications for notions 
of embodiment, materialism and selfhood. 
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“Material”: “composed of matter. The soul of animals is material, 
that of humans is spiritual.” (Furetière)1 
 
“The soul is to the body as scent is to incense.” (L’âme matérielle)2 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Early conceptions of the organic soul 
3. The interpenetration of medicine and metaphysics: models for the 
material soul 
4. The anatomy of brutes and the corporeal soul: Willis 
5. Resources for a psychophysiology: Malebranche 
6. The material soul as “purest fire” and “subtle wind”: Lamy 
7. L’âme matérielle 
8. Materialism and the soul’s remainder: La Mettrie and Diderot 
9. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the radical streams of early modern thought, from ‘anatomical-
metaphysical’ treatises such as the Epicurean physician Guillaume Lamy’s 
Discours anatomiques, clandestine manuscripts such as L’Âme matérielle, and, 
some generations later, La Mettrie’s L’Homme-Machine, we find a unique 
intellectual situation in which materialism is asserted while the existence of 
the soul is not denied. At first glance this may seem contradictory: isn’t one of 
the key tenets of materialism the denial of the soul in favour of the sole 
existence of the body (or the brain)? In fact, as readers familiar with Lucretius 
and Epicurus and their early modern posterity already know, there is a 
intermediate, or perhaps we should say hybrid option, in which the immortal, 
or purely intellective soul is denied, but a material soul is affirmed. And 
indeed, it was an old idea. The thesis of the materiality of the soul is 
considered to be a characteristic materialist tenet well before the thesis of the 
eternity of matter and motion (Mothu 1990-1991) or the inherence of motion 
                                                 
1 Furetière 1702, p. 518. Unless otherwise indicated all translations are ours. 
2 L’Âme matérielle, 2003, p. 174. 
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in matter, with Toland. Thus the Abbé Pluquet, in his eighteenth-century 
catalogue of heresies – which, like other works by anti-materialist clerics 
(apologeticists), always proves to be a helpful guide to the internal structures 
of heterodox thought – explains that the thinkers he calls “Materialists or 
Materials” (Matérialistes ou Matériels, terminology he attributes to Tertullian) 
believe “that the soul is born of matter.”3  
This concept is sometimes presented as deriving from medicine 
(Thomson 2008) or from theological debate (Henry 1989, Kors 1990), and of 
course texts such as the revealingly titled Religio medici by Thomas Browne 
(on the religious side) and Guillaume Lamy’s Discours anatomiques (on the 
atheistic side) fuse medical and theological discourses together. The 
physician’s knowledge of the structure of the body can be presented as a 
posteriori knowledge of design – something Harvey and to a lesser extent 
Willis do, and Boyle did much more emphatically, particularly in his 1688 
Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things, in which he takes Harvey’s 
discovery of the circulation of the blood to be evidence of design, and 
presents Harvey himself as supporting this view.4 But the physician’s 
knowledge of the body can also support the claim that there is no immortal 
soul (Lamy, L’âme matérielle, La Mettrie); there may exist a material soul, that 
dies with us, as doctors claim to have observed. Of course, depending on their 
own ideological convictions, physicians can either claim that on the Last 
Judgment we are resurrected as a whole (body and soul) or, in proper 
Lucretian fashion, that we need have no fear because afterwards there is – 
nothing. 
It is important to note that the very existence of such a concept as the 
material soul – in its different contexts, registers and intentions – challenges 
received notions of both materialism and the history of psychological 
concepts such as intentionality. Consider the following verdict on 
materialism, in a discussion of eighteenth-century French thought: 
 
                                                 
3 Pluquet 1762/1788, II, s.v. “Matérialistes,” p. 300.  
4 “I remember that when I asked our famous Harvey . . . what were the things that induced 
him to think of a circulation of the Blood? He answered me, that when he took notice that the 
valves in the veins of so many several parts of the body, were so placed that they gave free 
passage to the blood towards the heart, but opposed the passage of the venal blood the 
contrary way: he was invited to imagine, that so provident a cause as nature had not plac'd so many 
valves without design. . . .” (Boyle, Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things, in Boyle 
1772/1968, vol. V, p. 427; emphasis ours). But Boyle also warns against taking final causes to 
be more primary than natural science: “the naturalist should not suffer the search, or the 
discovery of a Final Cause of Nature’s works, to make him under-value or neglect the 
studious indagation [investigation] of their efficient causes” (ibid., p. 411). 
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Materialism as a working philosophy, used as a tool in the 
scientific investigation of the material universe, is appropriate 
and highly effective. Intended for the objective analysis and 
description of the world of externals, it yields disastrous results 
when applied to the inner, subjective world of human nature, 
human thought, and human emotions.5 
 
Our response is not strictly that it yields, or yielded only the best results, but 
that the world of subjectivity, of inner principles of animation and desire, is 
far from being either a polar opposite of what the materialist project seeks to 
grasp, or somehow categorically out of its reach.6 
In what follows we reconstruct the conceptual persona of the ‘material 
soul’ in the early modern period. There are many materialist concepts of 
‘mind’ (as locus of mental activity), in which the soul can be presented as 
integrated within an embodied, material whole – whether in the metaphysical 
context of a ‘functional dualism’ (Wright 2000), the medicalised approach to 
types of soul (corporeal, incorporeal, etc.) or the more naturalistic context of 
soul as the product of the brain. Descartes is often granted a paradigmatic 
status in these debates, as having articulated a conception of body-soul 
relations that played a defining role in his time (also because his delimitation 
allows – up to a point – for the safe pursuit of medicine and natural 
philosophy, as distinct from the metaphysics of substance dualism). But as 
our discussion shows (see also Wright 1991a), he was not so paradigmatic: 
either because of a more pronounced Epicurean dimension of the debates (to 
which the concept of material soul in large part belongs), or because post-
Cartesians such as Regius, Boerhaave and Gaub are actually quite far 
removed from either Cartesian mechanism and/or Cartesian physiology.7 A 
somewhat different point, discussed in sections 5 and 7, is the usage of 
Malebranche’s account of brain and animal spirits – itself an extension of 
Cartesian themes, but an original one – in a materialist direction. 
One major objection to the materiality of the soul, which forms an 
alternate line of development, concerns its mortality or immortality (and its 
materiality or immateriality, which were often run together with the former 
distinction). At least as early as Locke in the late seventeenth century (himself 
                                                 
5 Hill 1968, p. 90. 
6 For a related opposition between a more ‘static’ picture of early modern materialism and 
one which emphasises its fluid, humoral, dynamic character see Sutton and Tribble’s critique 
of Hawkes (forthcoming). 
7 In addition, figures at the intersection of medicine and metaphysics like Francis Glisson 
(Henry 1987) effectively do not belong to any of these ‘traditions’ or ‘trajectories’. That 
Descartes has come to be understood in much more ‘embodied’ terms in recent years does not 
affect the story told in this paper (see Sutton 1998, Wolfe 2012a, 2012b). 
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perhaps influenced by earlier Puritans such as Richard Baxter8), and 
extending as far as Priestley in the late eighteenth century, the case was 
clearly and fluently made that one could be an observant and devout 
Christian without being committed to substance dualism (itself suspected of 
being a piece of Catholic metaphysics). These arguments about the divine 
superaddition of matter to thought combine sophisticated appeals to 
Scripture and a priori conceptual analysis of, e.g., thought and matter as 
substances. Thus Locke famously and influentially claimed that since we do 
not, and cannot know the essence of matter or thought, we cannot know with 
any certainty whether God (“Omnipotency”) could give (“superadd”) matter 
the power of thought9: “he who will give himself leave to consider freely . . . 
will scarce find his Reason able to determine him fixedly for, or against, the 
Soul’s Materiality.”10  
But it was also possible to challenge this ‘doxa’ concerning the soul by 
appealing to a different source: an Epicurean, then humoral, then chimiatric 
and finally materialist tradition, from Epicurus and Lucretius to Robert 
Burton, Thomas Willis, Guillaume Lamy, the anonymous clandestine texts 
discussed here such as L’âme matérielle, and La Mettrie. Should one speak of a 
humoral materialism? 11 An Epicurean tradition? The Epicurean concept of 
material soul – by which we mean an artefact of early modernity, not 
something found in the original Epicurean corpus, although some of its key 
components include citations of texts such as Lucretius’ De rerum natura – is a 
combination of several elements, including: 
- the notion of the organic soul, coming out of the naturalistic 
appropriation of Aristotle’s De anima with Pomponazzi and others (to 
which specifically Epicurean elements are added); 
- the corporeal soul in a ‘neuropsychological’ context, with Willis; 
- Malebranche’s post-Cartesian psychophysiology of animal spirits. 
We shall present the key features of these three elements (§§ 2, 4, 5 below), 
along with some reflections on how medicine and metaphysics are articulated 
in this process (§ 3), before showing how they come together in two key texts 
of the early modern Epicurean tradition: the writings of the seventeenth-
century Epicurean physician Guillaume Lamy (§ 6), and the clandestine 
                                                 
8 In his 1682 work Of the immortality of mans soule . . ., Baxter challenged “the Cartesians” in 
the name of devotion to God, ironically “confessing” that he was “too dull to be sure that God 
cannot endue matter itself with the formal virtue of Perception” (cit. in Henry 1987, p. 36). 
9 Locke 1975, IV.iii.6, pp. 540-541. 
10 Ibid., p. 542. 
11 Some historians consider humoralism as “an alternative way to study the body” which 
allows for “a consideration of the ‘lived’ body” (Smith 2008, p. 473). We do not discuss this 
aspect here; see Wolfe 2012a.  
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manuscript L’âme matérielle (§ 7). Then we turn, in § 8, to the explicitly 
materialist reception of these ideas in the mid-eighteenth century, before 
concluding (§ 9) with some reflections on models of the material soul and 
their implications for the history of materialism. 
 
 
2. Early conceptions of the organic soul 
 
Aristotle defines the soul as “the first actuality of a natural body which 
has organs” in book II of De anima (412 b 5-6). In the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries this supported a psychology that gave each activity of the soul both 
a psychological and physical explanation.12 For example, memory was 
defined as a capacity for recall but was also located in the vapours in the 
posterior ventricle of the brain.13 The way in which Aristotle’s De anima was, 
in his own view, inscribed in a ‘biological’ project, continuous with his more 
explicitly biological works (on the parts, generation and movement of 
animals) has been increasingly recognised in recent scholarship (van der Eijk 
2005). And the availability of this work for more heterodox projects of 
‘naturalisation’ in early modernity is patent in the opening lines of the 
treatise: the “study of the soul” contributes greatly to the “study of nature” 
(De an., 402 a 5–6), because the soul is a “principle of life.” This began with 
commentators on De anima and other writers in the Aristotelian tradition, who 
introduced arguments based on anatomical information into treatments of the 
organic soul (Park 1988). Further, in the part of Avicenna ‘s Shifâ’ (published 
1020-1027) which came to be viewed as a commentary on Aristotle’s De anima 
during the later Middle Ages, we find a distinction drawn between the study 
of the soul in itself, which belongs to metaphysics, and the study of the soul as 
the principle of animation, which belongs to natural philosophy (Lagerlund 
2004). 
Overall, the initial naturalisation of the Aristotelian system took shape 
because natural philosophers did not restrict their analysis to the final and 
formal causes of psychological phenomena (the soul and its faculties), but also 
focused on efficient and material causes (perhaps primarily so), which they 
interpreted as the physical processes accounting for these phenomena and the 
organs in which they took place.14 This increasingly marked turn towards 
physiological organs was, unsurprisingly, presented as Aristotle’s own view 
                                                 
12 Park 1988, Des Chene 2000. 
13 Park 1988, p. 468. 
14 Park 1988, p. 468; Rapp 2006. 
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in each case, which begins to look rather forced once the organic soul is 
explicitly presented as material (it was already accepted by many to be 
extended and divisible), and identified with spiritus, the vapour refined from 
humours in the blood that was thought to fill the arteries and the nerves.15 
Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), influenced by Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, argued in his scandalous Tractatus de immortalitate animae 
(published 1516) that Aristotle’s analysis of the soul in De anima is 
inconsistent with the soul’s immortality; since Pomponazzi is not denying the 
latter, he infers that we can only know it through faith, not reason. In chapter 
8 of this work, he specifically claims that the human soul is always dependent 
on its organs (a view familiar from Galen’s late treatise on the soul’s 
dependence on the body), and is hence material. Discussing Aristotle’s 
doctrine of imagination (phantasia: cf. De anima, 431a16-17), he insists that it is 
entirely the product of material, sensory interactions.16 
The ease with which Aristotle could be taken up in a naturalistic 
project malgré lui (like Malebranche could in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries) was noted early on by Pierre Bayle. In the entry 
“Pereira” of his Dictionnaire, Bayle remarks with many conditionals that “one 
might believe” that “Aristotle only granted a difference between the animal 
soul and the human soul in terms of greater or lesser [capacities] of organs 
(une différence du plus au moins)”; this merely quantitative difference would 
entail that the human soul could carry out subtle reasoning, while the animal 
soul could only do so “in a confused manner.” And this “confirms the claim 
of those who say he [Aristotle] did not believe in the immortality of the 
soul.”17 To be clear, Bayle is not agreeing with the view, but is noting the ease 
with which it can be proclaimed, and credited to Aristotle. 
Thus natural philosophy by the mid-sixteenth century produced a 
concept sometimes referred to as the ‘organic soul’, in which the concept of 
soul – at some distance from Christian eschatology – becomes primarily an 
explanatory, natural-philosophical construct for our animating life functions, 
and how these relate to human intellective or rational capacities. As Park 
defines it, the organic soul is “the principle responsible for those life functions 
inextricably tied to the bodies of living beings and immediately dependent on 
their organs.”18 Simpler, baser life functions of nutrition, growth and 
                                                 
15 Park 1988, p. 483; she mentions Melanchton and Telesio, to which we can add Pomponazzi 
and Cardano. 
16 There are multiple strands of these naturalistic reinterpretations of Aristotle; for instance, 
the anonymous manuscript of 1659 Theophrastus redivivus tries to restate Aristotle’s Prime 
Mover in these terms (Paganini 1985). 
17 Bayle, “Pereira,” remark E, in Bayle 1740, vol. 3, p. 653; see Paganini 1985. 
18 Park 1988, p. 464. See also Sutton forthcoming. 
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reproduction were observed across different species, but sensitive, even 
cognitive, life functions were observed and collected into another level of 
organic soul. While the localisation of vital and cognitive functions was 
already an ancient research program (“among the ancients, there were many 
who located the soul in the brain, the heart, the chest, or ‘in some hidden 
place, from which like a spider it runs through the whole body when 
opportunity bids’”19), as can be seen in the above discussions of De anima, this 
increasingly becomes a vision of organic unity, with a growing emphasis on 
physiological explanations of parts of the soul. In some cases, physiology was 
the deciding factor in an argument, and even forced substantial revisions to 
common doctrine.20 
In medicine – and radiating outwards across disciplines, as exemplified  
with humoralism and the notion of melancholy – this Aristotelian or post-
Aristotelian faculty psychology is combined with the Galenic humoral 
doctrine, providing a framework for understanding health, disease, and 
temperament which spanned cognitive, vital, and nutritive activity. A key 
text here is Galen’s late and rather provocative short treatise (sometimes 
referred to as a pamphlet), That the Faculties of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of 
the Body, or in shorter form The Soul’s Dependence On The Body.21 According to 
Galen, the character or “substance of soul”is determined by, or ‘follows upon’ 
the mixture (kraseis: also ‘temperaments’22) of elements in the body, which, in 
its turn, depends on diet and daily activities. The soul has three faculties 
(dunameis) that have their seats in specific bodily organs: reason is located in 
the brain, volition and courage in the heart, and desire in the liver; e.g., the 
reasoning faculty will be a “mixture within the brain” (p. 153). A surplus of 
yellow bile in the brain, for instance, results in madness, and an accumulation 
                                                 
19 Des Chene 2000, p. 191, citing the Coimbra Jesuit commentaries on De Anima. 
20 Park 1988, p. 483. The soul as life function continues to be invoked at least as late as 
Descartes’s discussion with Plempius on how a heart freshly extracted from a living body 
continues to beat. As Lucian Petrescu shows (Petrescu, ms. 2012), Descartes uses Plempius’ 
observation as an argument against the motor force of the sensitive soul: the soul is not 
supposed to remain and act in a dead heart: “how . . . can the movement which occurs in the 
cut-up bits of the heart depend on the human soul, when it is taken as an article of faith that 
the rational soul is indivisible, and has no sensitive or vegetative soul attached to it?” (AT I, p. 
524 / CSMK, pp. 80-81). Thanks to Lucian Petrescu for sharing his work on Plempius and 
Descartes with us. 
21 Galen 1997, pp. 150-176. The original title is Quod animi mores sequuntur temperamenta 
corporis, or in Greek, ΓΑΛΗΝΟΥ ΟΤΙ ΤΑΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΡΑΣΕΣΙΝ ΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ 
ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ ΕΠΟΝΤΑ. 
22 Krasis is usually translated as ‘blending’ or ‘mixture’; our temperament is the result of a 
given humoral mixture (hence ‘idiosyncrasy’, idiosunkrasia), to which Galen devotes a 
separate treatise, On Mixtures. 
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of black bile in melancholy23 (thus eukrasia is the healthy balance of the 
elements while dyskrasia is an imbalance, which is a cause of disease). Health 
is defined as a proper mixture of the four humours, and a concomitant 
equilibrium in the balance of the four qualities. 
More provocatively, Galen goes so far as to affirm that soul and its 
parts actually are the temperaments of organs in which they reside: the mortal 
part of the soul (although he is at best agnostic, and in fact sceptical regarding 
the immortal part) is just “the mixture of the body”24; even if there were a 
“separate substance” for the soul, it would still be dependent on (“a slave to”) 
the mixtures of the body (p. 155). That is, given the presence of these various 
humoral mixtures in any part of our body, the soul “cannot but be a slave to 
the body”; but Galen then modifies this into an identity statement (rather than 
one of dependence): “it is preferable to say . . . that the mortal part of the soul 
is the mixture of the body” (p. 157, emphasis ours). We could immediately 
label this a medical materialism, but Galen goes in a slightly different 
direction – still reductionist but more practical than ontological. On the basis 
of his vision of soul as produced by humoral mixture, he derives a further 
thesis: doctors rather than philosophers should be entrusted with the 
education or re-education of individuals, to lead them towards virtue. As 
Lamy and La Mettrie will loudly proclaim (and as we discuss later on), 
doctors can and should play this role precisely insofar as they are in a position 
to modify the moral and intellectual qualities of the soul, since it is viewed as 
dependent or ‘following upon’ the temperaments of the bodily organs. Hence 
the soul will be responsive to changes in diet, environment and overall tenor 
of life which medical science will manage. 
Galen’s idea that the soul is susceptible to disease, and hence mortal, 
was also to be a powerful stimulus to heterodox, naturalistic and ultimately 
materialist arguments concerning the soul. This was seen early on and 
aroused both Platonic and Aristotelian-inspired responses.25 Some defend the 
view that the soul is the form of the body – indeed the form that gives 
existence (actuality) to the living body – and thus a special, irreducible 
substance, rather than an accident of the body as a complete substance. The 
                                                 
23 Bos 2009, pp. 35-36. 
24 Galen 1997, pp. 153, 157. 
25 For Platonic responses to Galen, see Hirai 2011, ch. 2 (on Jean Fernel’s Christianised- 
Platonic reaction to the resurgence of Galenism); for Aristotelian responses, Des Chene 2000, 
ch. 4, and for Renaissance responses (and artful combinations of Aristotle, Hippocrates and 
Galen) within a medical context, Martin forthcoming. 
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dependence relation goes the other way round, on this view.26 Galen had 
already reacted to Aristotelian counter-claims by granting that the soul is the 
form of the body – but in the sense that the parts of the soul are the forms of 
each corresponding bodily organ. 
Interestingly, some Aristotelians could perfectly well accept that the 
soul is affected when the body’s qualities are altered; but they then added a 
categorical challenge: as Des Chene puts it, the question is not whether some 
parts of the soul are affected or not, but “what that tells us about the category 
to which the soul belongs.”27 This will be rearticulated as a transcendental 
argument against humoral medicine and/or the psychophysiology of animal 
spirits, by various thinkers including Malebranche, Cudworth and Berkeley.28 
In the 1640s, Sir Thomas Browne, who was willing to accept the Galenic 
‘evidence’ that the soul, for “the performance of her ordinary actions,” 
requires both a “symmetry and proper disposition of organs” and a “crasis 
(i.e. krasis, CW) and temper correspondent to its operations,” nevertheless 
considered that all of this “flesh” was the “instrument” of the soul, not the 
soul itself.29 
This fear of contamination, disguised as a diagnosis of a category 
mistake, was justified if we consider the legacy of Galenic humoralism as 
‘humoral materialism’, for in addition to the blurring of ‘disciplinary’ 
discursive boundaries between medicine and philosophy, it challenges one of 
the more powerful arguments in favor of substance dualism: the non-
communicability of thinking substance and extended substance, or more aptly 
put, of soul and body.30 Thus Timothie Bright, the chief physician at St 
Bartholomew’s Hospital in London, in his 1586 Treatise of Melancholie (which 
influenced Shakespeare’s usage of the concept in “Hamlet”31), is concerned 
with how “the body and corporall things, affect the soule,” and how the soul 
affects the body in turn.32 Whatever the effects of the body on the soul may be, 
                                                 
26 Des Chene speaks of “ontological dependence” (Des Chene 2000, pp. 71-72). Cesare 
Cremonini makes just this charge: that contemporary Aristotelians are inverting the causal 
relationship between soul and body (see Martin forthcoming). 
27 Des Chene 2000, p. 71.  
28 Berkeley insists that “the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and . . . consequently 
incorruptible”; the decay and dissolution which occurs in natural bodies “cannot possibly 
affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance”; hence “the soul of man is naturally immortal” 
(Berkeley 1710, I, § 141 in Berkeley 1999, p. 87). 
29 Browne 1892, § XXXVI, p. 78. 
30 Galen 1997, pp. 282-283. 
31 Dover Wilson 1935, pp. 227, 309f. Bright was also the inventor of modern shorthand (see his 
1588 Characterie: an Arte of Shorte, Swift, and Secret Writing by Character). For more on Bright on 
humours see Henry 1989 and Wright 2000. 
32 Bright 1586, Epistle Dedicatory, n.p. = p. iv. 
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these cannot bring about, Bright insists, any “alteration of substance, or 
nature.”33 Namely, the idea of a communicability between body and soul via 
humours is a kind of category mistake, and a dangerous one. While Galen 
himself did not make any overt philosophically reductionist claims (as distinct 
from claiming to provide a medically reductionist account), in an early modern 
context these ideas, whether directly quoted or modified, sound quite 
different, e.g. when the Gassendist François Bernier suggests that “it would 
appear that Galen was persuaded the Soul was a spirit that emerged out of 
the blood,”34 or when Browne alludes to the ‘wrong’ sort of influence Galen 
could have: “I remember a Doctor in Physick, of Italy, who could not perfectly 
believe the immortality of the soul, because Galen seemed to make a doubt 
thereof.”35 
In positive terms, this type of integrated view meant that “moral 
physiologists and medical psychologists alike could draw especially on rich 
traditions of psychological explanation in terms of alterations in the animal 
spirits.”36 Consider Robert Burton in his sui generis cultural-humoralist 
treatise The Anatomy of Melancholy, first published in 1621. Burton allows for 
an interaction between different kinds of “distraction” in body and soul:  
 
For as the distraction of the mind, amongst other outward 
causes and perturbations, alters the temperature of the body, so 
the distraction and distemper of the body will cause a 
distemperature of the soul, and ‘tis hard to decide which of 
these two do more harm to the other.37  
 
How can the body, which is material, work on the immaterial soul? By means 
of humours: “the body, being material, worketh upon the immaterial soul, by 
mediation of humours and spirits, which participate of both” (ibid.). 
In negative terms, consider also that Burton speaks of the rational soul 
as a “pleasant but doubtful subject.”38 Even when physicians insisted that 
they were working within a circumscribed profession, and not seeking to be 
metaphysicians, their success could plead against them: thus Bright saw that 
precisely the success of physicians in curing diseases which involved ‘the 
                                                 
33 Bright 1586, ch. X, p. 39. On Bright’s warnings about the implications of the humoral 
concept see Trevor 2004, p. 49. 
34 Bernier 1678, vol. V, p. 452, and generally vol. V, book VI, ch. iii: “What the animal soul is.” 
35 Browne 1892, § XXI, p. 45. 
36 Sutton forthcoming; Sutton 1998, pp. 31-49; Iliffe 1995, pp. 433-434. 
37 Burton 1628, I, v, 10, “Continent, inward, antecedent, next causes and how the body works 
on the mind.” 
38 Burton 1628, I, ii, 9, “Of the Rational Soul.”  
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soul’ implied that virtue and vice would gradually become “nought else but 
fault[s] of humour.”39 It was thus was a natural reaction to suspect atheism, 
whether willing or unwilling, in these increasingly imperialistic statements of 
medical ‘pneumatology’ – which, as we shall see below, is precisely what 
Willis’s neuro-anatomical and metaphysical reconfiguration of the soul 
brought about. 
From the organic soul to humoral medicine (and its philosophical 
ramifications or interpenetrations), soul and body are “continuously 
resubjected to a series of mappings, and experts recognised that this 
relationship was one of mutual causation.”40 In disciplinary terms, this should 
modify the presentation found of the ‘mind-body problem’ in early modern 
philosophy, since here we have a concept of soul as a product (loosely 
defined) of medical, anthropological, physiological knowledge,41 which is 
effectively travelling back and forth between natural-philosophical, medical 
and metaphysical discourses. 
 
3. The interpenetration of medicine and metaphysics: models for 
the material soul 
 
The soul is thus a go-between concept, a “boundary concept”42 which 
crosses the borders between life sciences and metaphysics, but also between 
medicine and theology. For just as there were theologically motivated medical 
works such as Thomas Browne’s 1643 De religio medici (which begins with 
Browne deploring rumors of doctors being atheists as the “general scandal of 
my Profession”43), there were also medically motivated works of radical or 
heretical theology, engaging in polemics such as that concerning the immortal 
or mortal soul,44 which, as the previous section should indicate, were 
something like low-hanging fruit for naturalistically inclined thinkers. One of 
these partly polemical works bears the explicit title L’âme matérielle, and we 
will return to it in the final sections of this essay. 
 This role of the medical works – and their impact on ‘philosophical’ 
works which deliberately locate themselves at the intersection of medicine, 
natural philosophy and (heterodox) metaphysics, like L’âme matérielle or, to an 
                                                 
39 Bright 1586, Epistle Dedicatory, n.p. (= p. iii). 
40 Iliffe 1995, p. 433. 
41 Iliffe 1995, p. 434. The tenor of our discussion owes a lot to the stimulating analysis in 
Sutton forthcoming. 
42 Star and Griesemer 1989. 
43 Browne 1892, § I, p. 1. 
44 The best study of this is Thomson 2008; see also Vartanian 1982, Thomson 2006. 
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extent, La Mettrie’s writings – is systematically underplayed or unnoticed by 
commentators. 
Historians of philosophy (here, Garber in an impressive survey of the 
issue) tend to present the situation of the soul in the seventeenth century as 
“by and large about the ways in which philosophers either make use of or 
reject incorporeal substance in accounting for life and other features of the 
physical world.”45 Earlier traditions remain, but the idea of the soul is no 
longer tied to form and matter. “It is a question of what (if anything) we must 
add to body, a question of establishing the limits of what can be explained in 
terms of body alone, and what must be posited over and above body.”46 For 
natural philosophers, this is a question of body qua matter, but for physicians 
it is mostly a question of body qua human body (or a comparative approach 
to human and animal bodies), and this is missing from the above analysis. 
The soul does not have to be derived from an analysis of substance. 
Physicians like Thomas Willis read the existence of the soul from the nature of 
the human being and others in a more explicit Epicurean context (from 
Gassendi to Lamy) sought to integrate the “life of the soul” with medicine and 
thereby modify metaphysics, turning it away from, e.g. substantivalism, while 
also stressing either the Galenic theme of the soul as “mixture of the body” or 
the lack of any categorical separation between animal and human souls 
(Pomponazzi). Garber’s characterisation of the use or rejection of incorporeal 
substance is a useful philosophical reminder, but metaphysicians were not the 
only students of the soul. What is missing from view here is that, whilst 
physiological studies are the primary operation of the physician, these are not 
conducted without reference to the soul. As Katharine Park puts it, referring 
to the work of Walter Pagel,  
 
Some began to approach the vexed problem of the origin of the 
soul as a problem in embryology rather than in metaphysics or 
theology; for many sixteenth-century philosophers, unlike their 
medieval predecessors, the answer lay in the sequential 
development of the organs rather than in the successive infusion 
of different levels of soul.47 
 
A different point from Garber’s, but which also runs somewhat counter 
to the narrative of this essay, and the texts discussed here, is John Henry’s, 
stressing the existence of a real divide between medical and philosophical 
                                                 
45 Garber 1998, p. 763. 
46 Garber 1998, p. 762. 
47 Park 1988, p. 482, citing Pagel 1967, pp. 233-247 (thanks to Benny Goldberg for this 
reference). 
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texts in the period, such that that radical and atheistic ideas are more 
influenced by Hobbes, Epicurus et al. than by the ‘medicalisation of the soul’ 
we are interested in.48 He grants that Glisson’s 1672 treatise On the Energetic 
Nature of Substance is an exception, but notes that it was difficult and not 
widely discussed. The type of texts we deal with here, while they indeed did 
not circulate the way the writings of Hobbes or Spinoza did (and lack their 
fame over subsequent centuries), are a clear counter-example to this claim of 
Henry’s (repeated uncritically by others).  
It is not easy to reduce the history to either a clear conceptual claim or 
a set of neatly demarcated traditions and contexts, but in contrast to the 
disciplinary boundaries which both Garber and Wright seem to explicitly rely 
on, we would point to (i) the naturalistic appropriation of Aristotle’s De 
anima, itself part of a trend we might call (ii) the medicalisation of natural 
philosophy, (iii) the Galenic challenge to traditional philosophical concepts of 
soul in medical terms, and (iv) the emergence of a ‘humoral materialism’ to 
which physicians such as Timothie Bright could react, as we saw above, with 
concern about what would befall the concept of an immortal, immaterial and 
causally ‘out of reach’ soul, if temperament could be explained in terms of 
humours. In this sense, Rob Iliffe is closer to our view when he writes that “In 
an important sense, the soul – its location and its function as the active and 
moral essence of the individual – should be seen as the product of this 
forensic and physiological knowledge.”49 
Similar to the analysis of the ‘organic soul’ in previous centuries, the 
idea is that theorists of the soul gradually moved away from traditional ‘parts 
of the soul’ representations, and “drew more and more from contemporary 
work in medicine, though this was of course still limited by theological 
doctrine” (ibid.). And contrary not just to mainstream history of philosophy 
but also history of medicine, this productivity of the concept of soul 
(naturalistically reconfigured) extends beyond Cardano, Willis and Lamy, for 
some observation reveals that up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
medical thinkers staked out their own scientific views in physiology, 
pathology but also emerging neuroscience through discussions of the role of 
the soul in the body.50 It should be clear how much this contrasts with the old-
fashioned view – here, in the words of Roger French – that “the advance of 
physiology after Whytt [thus in the last third of the eighteenth century, CW] was 
an erosion of the concept of soul.”51 The latter view relies on a separation 
                                                 
48 Henry 1989, pp. 92-93; repeated as such by Garber 1998, p. 764. 
49 Iliffe 1995, p. 434. 
50 Wright 1991b, p. 22; Hagner 1992. 
51 French 1969, p. 161. 
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between an increasingly scientific medicine and a more archaic, 
metaphysically influenced natural philosophy, which our work (in addition to 
that of Park, Wright and Thomson) should indicate is in serious need of 
revision. But elsewhere, in what is in many respects a landmark paper, 
Wright reintroduces a traditional distinction between what happens in 
metaphysics, and what happens in medicine, suggesting that substance 
dualism belongs to metaphysics, whereas function dualism belongs to 
medicine.52 
In contrast, the present analysis tends to show that they are always 
combined: physicians claim special authority when making pronouncements 
on the nature of the soul, and in doing so revise, eliminate and generally 
appropriate a tradition in which Aristotle, Galen, Pomponazzi or Descartes 
are as present as ‘strictly’ medical figures. Conversely, philosophers, 
particularly those of an Epicurean and/or materialist bent, will invoke 
medical ‘evidence’ (from mental trauma and the action of poisons to the 
behavior of decollated lizards) to support their critiques of the notion of an 
immortal soul. And at least as far back as Avicenna’s reception of Aristotle’s 
De anima and, closer to our period here, Girolamo Cardano’s naturalisation of 
the problem of the soul’s immortality, the question of the soul has produced 
mobile differentiations (partly as a ‘go-between’, as mentioned above) 
between a metaphysical approach and a natural-philosophical approach. 
Cardano even entitled a section at the end of his 1545 treatise De immortalitate 
animorum, “A digression on the immortality of the soul in a natural-
philosophical fashion” (naturaliter loquens).53 Cardano went so far as to claim 
that medical knowledge was more certain than natural philosophy, which he 
claimed derives causes from effects, while medicine infers effects from 
causes.54 He also argued that it was possible to use medical principles to 
investigate issues of natural philosophy that were not directed toward 
medical purposes, and cited the third book of Aristotle’s Problemata that 
concerns drunkenness as an example of such an investigation.55 
We find these episodes to be rather more conceptually significant than 
appears from the diagnosis given by John Henry, according to which “The 
eclectic neo-Platonism of the Renaissance gave rise to a number of confusions 
                                                 
52 Wright 2000, p. 238. 
53 “Digressio de animi immortalite secundum naturaliter loquentes.” Thanks to Hiro Hirai for 
this point. 
54 “Et ob hoc intelligimus, Medicinam esse certiorem naturali philosophia, cum naturalis 
philosophia semper procedat ab effectibus ad causas, Medicina vero persaepe a causis supra 
effectus” (Cardano 1663/1966, vol. 8, p. 585, cit. in Martin forthcoming). 
55 Siraisi 1997, pp. 52-57; Martin forthcoming. 
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or contaminations between notions of spiritus, pneuma, and anima.”56 That 
various texts sought to bridge the gap between medicine and metaphysics (or 
pointed to the non-existence of such a gap in both the Galenic tradition and a 
certain reading of Aristotle on the soul via Alexander of Aphrodisias, the 
earliest commentator on Aristotle, and Pietro Pomponazzi), or blurred 
boundaries with their humoral materialism (as seen by Timothie Bright) is 
rather different from mere “confusion or contamination.” Similarly for the 
later two centuries, when early modern Epicureans discuss the claim found in 
Lucretius that the words ‘mind’, ‘soul’ and ‘intelligence’ really all mean the 
same thing,57 and do so in texts spanning medicine, natural philosophy and 
philosophy tout court, it may be “contamination,” but not just “confusion,” 
and if it is the former, it deserves to be understood. 
Of course, ‘soul’ is not an unchanging object with fixed contents and 
boundaries, which itself is trans-disciplinary and can be taken up, here by an 
English physician, there by a Coimbran Jesuit. Rather, our point, modifying 
the more traditional distinctions in play in the above analyses, is twofold. 
First, we note historically that, with figures including Boerhaave, Gaub, 
Cullen and Le Camus, there was a body-soul problem in and for medicine, 
growing out of some of the medicalisation of ‘pneumatology’ in natural 
philosophy as discussed above (hence, the claim that early modern debates on 
the soul did not significantly involve medicine would be historically false, or 
at least in need of significant revision). Second, we note that physicians, 
natural philosophers, and medically ‘influenced’ philosophers – both 
physicians writing ‘philosophy’, like Lamy; physicians who become 
philosophers, like La Mettrie; and philosophers whose career reflects a 
continuous engagement with developments in medicine and physiology, like 
Diderot – engage with this medical version of the body-soul problem and 
thereby bring about a naturalisation58 of the soul, and more generally are the 
first to defend naturalistic arguments in philosophy (understood as 
arguments which seek to show that a scientific concept or discovery can have 
direct bearing on philosophical claims; and here the Epicurean tradition is 
very present). 
Why was there a ‘body-soul’ problem in medicine, and what was it? 
The first context that comes to mind is Cartesian; entire books have been 
                                                 
56 Henry 1987, p. 23 (reprising a point made in Walker 1984). 
57 Yvon 1765, p. 570. 
58 On the idea of a ‘naturalisation of the mind’ in the early radical Enlightenment which is not 
quite an elimination of mental or animate properties in favor of the properties of basic matter, 
see Wolfe 2010; Hatfield comments that “Ontological questions were bracketed in order to 
concentrate on the study of mental faculties through their empirical manifestations in mental 
phenomena and external behavior” (Hatfield 1995, p.188). 
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written just on the specifically medical context of Cartesianism.59 Both during 
Descartes’ own lifetime and in the following decades, numerous physicians 
claimed to be carrying out a legitimate Cartesian project, e.g., eliminating final 
causes and explaining all of nature mechanically, including the human body, 
while in fact moving ever closer to Spinozism and/or materialism. Thus 
Henricus Regius (Hendrik le Roy), a physician and Professor of Theoretical 
Medicine at the University of Utrecht, often called the ‘first apostle of 
Cartesianism’ (e.g. in a review in the Nouvelles de la république des lettres in 
October 1686), asserted that the soul could be a mode of the body, with the 
body being understood as a machine, and that the human mind, inasmuch as 
it exists in a body, is organic.60 Even Marx (stealing from Renouvier’s history 
of philosophy) mentions Regius as a precursor of La Mettrie: “Descartes was 
still alive when Le Roy applied to the human soul the Cartesian idea of 
animal structure, and declared that the soul was but a mode of the body, and 
ideas were but mechanical motions.”61 Others asserted that Descartes was too 
timid, and one should be a Cartesian in physiology while eliminating 
substance dualism, in favour of a parallelism of physical events and mental 
events (Louis de La Forge62), or, rather tortuously, tried to argue ‘from’ 
Descartes towards a materialist account of mind-body interaction (Antoine 
Louis, J.-B. Du Hamel, Pierre Dionis – influenced by Lamy – and others). Such 
thinkers tried to collapse their ideas into Descartes’ own, but others – perhaps 
tellingly, outside of France – were quicker to dispense with any monopoly 
Descartes might have had over the prestige of mechanism in medicine, like 
Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738) or Hieronymus Gaub (1705-1780). 
Boerhaave’s 1690 doctoral thesis in philosophy at Leiden, where he 
was later Professor of Medicine, Botany, and Chemistry (he was widely 
viewed as the most influential lecturer in medicine in Europe, and taught 
figures including La Mettrie, Gaub and Haller) was entitled De distinctione 
mentis a corpora, and there he argued for a distinction between mind and 
body. But in his later Praelectiones academicae (Boerhaave 1739), he denied any 
medical or physiological pertinence to the substantival distinction between 
body and soul or mind (§ 27). Body and mind are united, communicated, 
mutually affect one another, and a change occurring in the one produces a 
change in the other (a view which may explain the unfair accusations of 
Spinozism that were laid against him). Boerhaave admits that he has no way 
of explaining this interaction experimentally (something La Mettrie is quick to 
                                                 
59 Most recently, Bitbol 1990, Aucante 2006, and Manning 2007 (a useful review essay). 
60 Regius 1646, pp. 248, 246. 
61 Marx, The Holy Family, VI, 3, d, discussed in Bloch 1977. 
62 de La Forge 1666, ch. XV. 
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fill in, both in his edition and translation of Boerhaave’s lectures, La Mettrie 
1747 and in his own writings); he considers three hypotheses, “physical 
influx,” occasional causes and divine harmony, and opts for the last (§ 27.7). 
He adds a remark that was repeated, with or without attribution, many times 
during this period (similar comments can be found in Galen): physicians 
should only concern themselves with the body, even when dealing with mental 
illness (or ‘diseases of the soul’), for once the body is working correctly, the 
mind will return to its proper “officium” (§ 27.8) – the ancient Stoic term for 
the role we are destined to play, which in this context can be rendered as 
“function.”63  
Boerhaave’s student Gaub, who took over his Chair in Leiden, gave a 
lecture there in 1747 which La Mettrie claimed to have attended (some 
months prior to finishing L’Homme-Machine), entitled De regimine mentis 
(translated in Rather 1965). This text is important for us because there Gaub 
articulates – or at least suggests – a clinical perspective on the problem of 
mind-body interaction (for he is speaking of mens rather than anima).64 La 
Mettrie spoke favourably about the ideas he heard, and his enthusiasm (more 
on which in our penultimate section) makes sense, for Gaub had defended the 
view that for the physician, the metaphysical distinction between mind and 
body is irrelevant. “Although the healing aspect of medicine properly looks 
toward the human body only, rather than the whole man, it does refer to a 
body closely united to a mind and, by virtue of their union, almost continually 
acting on its companion as well as being itself affected in turn.”65 Gaub refers 
to the authority of Descartes, “the most ingenious philosopher of his age,” 
who “yielded to physicians” regarding the priority of medicine in these 
matters (p. 74)66, and states that due to the variability of temperaments, itself 
explainable in humoral (and hence medical) terms, the philosopher “cannot 
dispense with the aid of the physician” where the mind is concerned (p. 86). 
So whereas some of the Cartesians, Boerhaave and Gaub thought that 
the body-soul union (or relation, depending on their convictions) fell under 
                                                 
63 On ‘officium’ or ‘office’ as a functional, teleological or ‘teleomechanical’ concept in early 
modern medicine, see Wolfe forthcoming 2012. 
64 Wright 2000, p. 249. Gaub, like Haller, did not appreciate La Mettrie’s materialist 
appropriation of his ideas, and in 1763 included a short essay against La Mettrie in his new 
edition of De regimine mentis (Rather 1965, pp. 115-117), calling him “a little Frenchman” who 
produced a “repulsive offspring . . . his mechanical man” (Gaub 1763, in Rather 1965, p. 115). 
65 Gaub 1747, in Rather 1965, p. 70, emphasis ours. 
66 Gaub has in mind the passage from Part VI of Descartes’ Discours de la méthode where 
Descartes notes the interpenetration of mind and the organs of the body, so that medicine is 
the best way to render people wiser than they have hithertoo been (AT VI, p. 62). Lalande 
observed in 1911 that similar remarks on the philosophical value and primacy of medicine 
can be found in Bacon’s De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, IV, 1-2 (Lalande 1911, p. 305). 
19 
 
the medical purview, but that it was perhaps best to focus on the body, others 
were more aggressively materialist in asserting the autonomy of medicine 
with respect to theology or other disciplines. Thus Boerhaave’s advice to 
physicians (only concern yourself with the body) becomes, in the Montpellier 
physician Ménuret de Chambaud’s entry “Mort” in the Encyclopédié, free of 
earlier niceties: 
 
The separation of the soul from the body, a mystery which may 
be even more incomprehensible than its union, is a theological 
dogma certified by religion, and consequently is uncontestable. 
But it is in no way in agreement with the lights of reason, nor is 
it based on any medical observation; hence we will not mention 
it in this purely medical article, in which we will restrict 
ourselves to describing the changes of the body, which, as they 
alone fall under the senses, can be grasped by the physicians, 
those sensual artists, sensuales artifices.67 
 
Here the medicalisation is administered in such strong doses that the concept 
of soul falls out altogether (and it is noticeable that the physician who wrote 
this article is ‘trespassing’ into theology or its opposite, with the term 
“mystery”).  
But these attempts to articulate and justify a specifically medical 
approach to body-soul relations (which, by the later eighteenth century, are 
gradually being termed ‘body-mind’ relations, although this is not at all 
absolute) can also accept substance dualism, albeit idiosyncratically. William 
Cullen, in physiological lectures given at the Royal College of Physicians of 
Edinburgh in the mid-1760s, reflects on substance dualism, not in order to 
reject it, but to give it a peculiarly medical cast. For Cullen, we can know the 
mechanism(s) governing our bodies, not that which governs our minds. Yet, 
like Boerhaave, he also thinks that our mental states are inseparable from 
“some conditions in the body.”68 Perhaps on ideological grounds, Cullen 
immediately appeals to the good reputation of Boerhaave and Haller, who 
were never “suspected of Irreligion” (ibid.). However, he also recognises that 
the mind-body problem remains problematic, including for physicians; and 
yet, the specifically medical version of the problem as he states it sounds 
much like a materialist statement (granted, an embodied materialist statement) 
from Diderot or La Mettrie. For Cullen reduces “the problem of the action of 
the mind upon the body” to the problem: “how one State of the body or of 
one part can affect another part of it” (ibid.). Of course, when Diderot says 
                                                 
67 Ménuret de Chambaud 1765/1966, p. 718b. 
68 Cullen, notes added to “Lectures on the Institutes of Medicine,” cit. in Wright 2000, p. 244. 
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such things (discussed below) he does not intend them to be circumscribed to 
medicine; rather, he (and La Mettrie) introduce into philosophy a naturalistic 
type of argument derived from the medical evidence (or theorizing). 
Similar (although not in medical-historical terms) to Cullen’s way of 
defending substance dualism while insisting on a specifically medical variant, 
the Paris physician Antoine Le Camus, in his Médecine de l’esprit (1753), put 
forth the program that medicine should know both minds and bodies, so that 
it can perfect the mind by acting on the body. Le Camus notes that most 
people would not deny medicine’s expertise when it comes to the body, but 
they would be reluctant to grant it authority over the mind, and he wants to 
remedy this situation: “to remedy to the vices of the mind is nothing other 
than to remedy the vices of the body.”69 Although phrased in terms of 
Cartesian dualism, Le Camus’ conception of medicine and of therapeutics is a 
different creature, for it belongs to the conceptual scheme of the “animal 
economy” – a more integrated, organisational approach.70 Though his title 
suggests that Le Camus is a sort of Cartesian (since the Cartesian thesis is that 
passions are effects of the mind-body union on the mind), he has more of an 
expansive conception of medicine, which we can consider as an outgrowth of 
the material soul concept. Similarly, Le Camus gestures initially in a Cartesian 
direction, saying he knows the soul is rational and immortal, but he 
immediately adds that it is also true that the soul is “aided in its operations” 
by “genuinely mechanical causes.”71 Whereas in some cases it was important 
to show that the medical dimension was an embodied dimension, Epicurean, 
and in other cases the medical argument is a strictly reductive argument (as in 
Ménuret), Le Camus’s program for medicine holds that it is the science which 
has equal knowledge of mind and body, and hence can treat their “abstract 
combinations,” and their “relations” (commerce). While terminologically he 
still refers to these as two substances, in practice he gives an integrated 
account of “virtues” and “passions” as being as much part of the body as of 
the soul.72  
From the medicalisation of natural philosophy in Cardano to the 
emergence of a specifically medical form of the body-soul problem in 
Boerhaave, then Le Camus, we hope that several points emerge clearly: (a) 
that it is a mistake to rule out medicine from an understanding of debates on 
the soul, particularly heterodox approaches to conceptualising the corporeal 
                                                 
69 Le Camus 1753, I, p. 7; “God only excites ideas in our souls relative to the dispositions in 
our bodies” (ibid., ch. III, section 2, p. 49). 
70 Huneman 2007, p. 266; see also Rey 2000. 
71 Le Camus 1753, I, p. xviii. 
72 Le Camus 1753, I, p. 111f .; II, p. 239. 
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soul (and ultimately the material soul), and restrict that understanding to 
metaphysics (Garber 1998), or (b) to judge the overlap between these 
disciplines as merely “confusing” (Henry 1989). Rather, (c) some began to 
approach the question of the soul – its nature, its origin, and relation to the 
body – as a problem in embryology (Park 1988), medicine and natural 
philosophy overall, rather than in metaphysics or theology (Iliffe 1995, Sutton 
forthcoming). And this new approach is a major step towards the concept of a 
material soul, e.g. the materialisation of the soul “understood as the function 
of a particular organised structure.”73 It was once debated whether these 
heterodox approaches to the soul were more Epicurean or more Cartesian (in 
the sense of a late, medically focused and/or radicalised Cartesianism). But as 
concerns the present paper, most of the significant and original texts we deal 
with – obviously Lamy, L’âme matérielle and La Mettrie – are more or less 
deliberate fusions (or at least blends) of the two, so this question recedes in 
the distance.74 
One can thus speak, not just of overlap but of a rich and complex 
interrelation of medicine and metaphysics on the question of the soul. But we 
have not yet reached an understanding of the specific notion of the material 
soul. For that we need to turn back to the late seventeenth century, in the next 
three sections: the place of the soul in the emerging neuroscience of the 
period, with Willis (section 4); the resources for a psychophysiology of animal 
spirits contributed by Malebranche (section 5), and the Epicurean concept of 
material soul put forth by Guillaume Lamy (section 6). Then we turn to the 
early eighteenth-century manuscript entitled L’Âme Matérielle (The Material 
Soul), in section 7; the reception and transformation of these ideas in 
materialist thought of the next generation (section 8), and conclude (section 9). 
At the risk of oversimplifying, we suggest that what was meant to be 
merely a part of the soul we have in common with animals – and a subaltern 
                                                 
73 Vartanian 1982, p. 152. 
74 The older view was Vartanian’s (who pointed to a hybrid of Malebranchian and Lucretian 
‘pneumatologies’ in Meslier’s Testament, Vartanian 1982, p. 154), much criticised by Thomson, 
who however did not replace it with another, clearly stated thesis but instead showed that 
particular textual passages contradict Vartanian’s model. Paganini has argued for a third 
model of material soul, neither Epicurean (Gassendi, Lamy) nor post-Cartesian-
Malebranchian (L’âme matérielle, La Mettrie, obviously combined with the former model). He 
suggests that the other major clandestine work of the period, the 1659 Theophrastus redivivus, 
shows the presence of a specifically Averroist-Paduan model of the soul as “actus corporis 
organici,” as elaborated e.g. in Pomponazzi’s 1516 Tractatus de immortalitate animae, ch. IX 
(Paganini 1985, p. 349f.). But it is not clear what impact this model had as such, since when it 
is discussed (typically in order to combat its ‘mortalism’), it is usually fused with variants of 
the other two models (Mothu 1990-1991, p. 391, n. 273) – and after all, the soul as material in 
an atomistic sense, as subtle fire or wind in a later Epicurean sense, and as the functional ‘act’ 
of an organic body, are all material soul concepts! 
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part at that – is gradually expanded in explanatory scope (notably through 
Willis’ work on Anima brutorum) until it comes to be a full-blown monistic 
concept: the material soul (from Lamy to La Mettrie). 
 
4. The anatomy of brutes and the corporeal soul: Willis 
 
Thomas Willis (1621-1675) was Sedleian Professor of Natural 
Philosophy at Oxford (where Locke was one of his students, attending 
lectures in the 1660s which included material later published in De anima 
brutorum) and also taught medicine in London, where he was an eminent 
physician; he was a founding member of the Royal Society. He is best known 
for his discovery of the ‘circle of Willis’ and his great work on the anatomy of 
the brain, the 1664 De cerebri anatome. Willis interlinks anatomy, the brain and 
the soul in a variety of works, but the one which primarily concerns us here is 
his later De anima brutorum (1672; English translation 1683), for it is there that 
he puts forth an extensive concept of “corporeal soul,” and somewhat 
unwittingly provides resources for further materialisation of the soul in toto. 
Willis’ account of the soul breaks down into three parts: a chimiatric 
theory (a chemical matter theory with particular focus on life functions), 
localised physiological explanations of cognitive processes, and the derivation 
of an incorporeal human soul on the basis of comparative anatomical studies 
– which is at the same time a blurring of the divide between the corporeal 
soul and the incorporeal soul. If one compares Willis to Descartes, the 
difference in their approach to matter is striking: whereas Descartes conceives 
of it mathematically, Willis is interested in its behaviour. When examining, 
e.g., the brain, he wants to know how it functions, where all the impressions 
from the nerves collect and are processed. Because it is not easy to 
immediately ‘read’ functions from anatomy, Willis uses comparative studies 
to eliminate certain structures or functions of the brain, in order to both 
localise certain functions, and also generalise functions across species if the 
same basic structures are present – for instance, by classifying different types 
of animals in terms of respiration, humours and blood,75 he can then go on to 
provide functional descriptions of different classes of animals. The same 
structures are seen by Willis to be replicated across species to varying degrees 
of complexity. Differences across species, such as the size and structure of the 
cerebral cortex, suggest the location of higher order functions such as 
                                                 
75 Willis 1683, ch. III, p. 7. 
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memory; whereas similarities, such as the near identical nature of the 
cerebellum across species, suggest baser, automatic functions.76  
Comparative anatomy both produces and complicates Willis’ account 
of the soul, but it is a method and a theory which is inherently organic. The 
human being is the origin and focus of his study, and is compared, not to the 
workings of nature, but to other living beings. One can see the organic soul 
taking shape in the emerging neuroscience of the seventeenth century. Willis 
describes complex cognitive processes in terms of the operation of animal 
spirits localised to different parts of the nervous system, largely based on 
comparative anatomy. He locates the imagination or “phantasies” in the 
middle or medullary part of the brain.77 
The nervous system of man is at once more refined and complex than 
any other animal, but so analogously constructed as to be indistinguishable in 
terms of cognitive function by any physiological principle. For Willis, 
structure and function are intimately linked. He can find no sufficient 
physiological difference between human beings and animals to account for 
their differences in cognitive capacity.78 His conception of an organic soul is 
so strong as to only infer an immaterial soul from the limits of the human 
body. Another functional claim deriving from Willis’s anatomical inquiries 
was that in the cerebrum, spirits flowing up through the spinal column form 
imaginations, sensations and memories by virtue of their motions, and then 
flow back out of the cerebrum to produce wilful, or seemingly rational 
actions—and this was why he granted animals not only the powers of 
sensation, but those of memory and even a lower ‘brutish’ rationality. In 
contrast, the cerebellum regulates the involuntary motions—from the 
cardiovascular system to digestion and even sexual arousal. Part of Willis’s 
justification for this division between cerebellum and cerebrum, which he 
maintained in both Cerebri Anatome and De Anima Brutorum, was the fact that 
animals seemed to have smaller cerebrums and larger cerebellums. But 
because humans are also animals, we also have a cerebellum. And motions in 
the cerebrum can disturb our otherwise involuntary functions.79 
Willis connects the different areas of comparative anatomy, the 
neurophysiology of animal spirits, a chimiatric conception of matter 
(explaining life through fermentation), and a complex differentiated theory of 
types of souls, with a strong influence, often acknowledged, of “the famous 
                                                 
76 Bynum 1973, p. 451. 
77 Willis 1683, ch. VII, pp. 41, 43. 
78 Bynum 1973, p. 453. 
79 This is the basis for the passions, according to Willis, although he offers no systematic 
explanatory model (or at least nothing close to that of Descartes). 
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Gassendus.”80 He endorsed a modified version of what he had read in both 
Gassendi and in the theologian Henry Hammond: humans all possess a 
tripartite nature.81 Like all animals they possess bodies and sensitive souls, 
but they also possess a rational soul, and the interrelation between these is the 
topic of De anima brutorum. Gassendi and the more general streams of 
Epicureanism associated with him influence Willis, both in the way he grants 
animals (contra Descartes) not just a sensitive capacity, but a rational one,82 
although he wavers on exactly how much, and in his chimiatric conception of 
matter – what we might call his pyrotechnic theory of internal chemical 
explosions in the body, for which he credits Gassendi: “But indeed, the same 
fiery nature of the soul, serves within the body by its own mobility, what a 
little flame of gunpowder does in a Cannon.”83  
The soul that interests Willis the ‘father of neuroscience’ and natural 
philosopher is the corporeal or sensitive soul, responsible for life functions 
(Willis 1683, p. 2). He divides the corporeal soul into two parts, the vital and 
the animal. The vital soul is the one he specifies in chemical and ‘pyrotechnic’ 
terms. The sensitive part of the soul is the animal spirits: 
 
There are therefore Corporeal Souls, according to its two chief 
functions in the Organical Body, viz., the Vital and Animal; two 
distinct parts, to wit, flamie and lucid, for what belongs to the 
said natural function, that indeed is involuntary of the Animal, 
and is performed by the help of the Animal Spirits.84 
 
The chemical properties of matter provide a basis for the organic soul, but it is 
in the operation of the body that this soul reveals itself. Animal spirits, 
considered as inherently volatile and active, play an important role in this 
conception of matter, which is chemically specified. The animal soul is “of a 
certain fiery nature, and its act or substance is either a Flame or a Breath, neer 
to, or a-Kin to Flame” (p. 5), its life is an “Inkindling of the Vital matter” (p. 7), 
and “the Part of the Corporeal Soul rooted in the Blood, is truly flamy” (p. 22). 
In rather lyrical terms, Willis also approving quotes Hippocrates to the effect 
that, so long as the soul survives in the body,  
                                                 
80 Willis 1684, p. 2; Willis 1683 opens with an admiring summary of Gassendi. 
81 Willis 1683, ch. VIII, p. 40. 
82 See his chapter entitled “Of the Science or Knowledge of Brutes,” Willis 1683, p. 32; Wright 
1991a, p. 249. The opening pages of Willis 1683 are in part a critique of the animal-machine 
concept (targeting Descartes and Digby). 
83 Willis 1684, p. 3 (pagination is specific to each text in this collection). Willis also says, 
however, that Gassendi does not provide the empirical details of how this vital chemistry of 
flame works (a gap he will presumably try and fill). 
84 Willis 1683, ch. IV, p. 22; see also p. 41. 
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It is always Born, even till Death, In which respect also, it seems to 
be most like flame, or rather the same thing, which is 
continually renewed almost every moment: Some parts of 
eithers subsistence, in like manner are consumed by burning, 
and fly away, and others in the meantime are laid up anew from 
the Food continually laid in.85 
 
This quasi-metabolic idea of a perpetual renewal is indeed a chimiatric 
concept of living matter, and Willis ‘cashes it out’ through the concept of 
fermentation. His work on the topic, De fermentatione (1659), was meant to be 
the introduction to his theory of fevers, which in fact he explained as the 
outcome of a vitiated fermentation of blood. Is fermentation chemical or 
mechanical? The chemiatric answer should be straightforwardly the former, 
since it describes all bodies as being composed of the principles of Spirit, 
Sulphur, Salt, Water and Earth and the mixture and proportion of these.86 
 But Willis complicates matters by sometimes speaking of fermentation 
in more purely chemiatric terms, sometimes in more mechanical terms, as a 
motion of the parts. Ferments helped kindle the particles of spirit and sulphur 
in the blood into a flame, a combustion that was also called effervescence of 
the blood, which is how Willis explains body heat and fever. The fermentation 
in the heart heats the blood like “Water Boyling over a Fire,”87 and this heat is 
distributed to the whole body through blood circulation, constituting the 
common cause of ordinary body warmth as well as febrile heat. Our body 
heat is the effect of a chemical cause – fermentation. And, most relevantly for 
us, “The first beginnings of life proceed from the spirit fermenting in the 
heart.”88 Willis also uses the language of life as being like a flame, which as we 
shall see below, influences Lamy and through him the clandestine materialist 
tradition that is central to our narrative: “The Life and Flame of the Blood ... 
are the same (p. 22). And further, “Life is not so like to flame, but even a flame 
it self” (p. 7). Willis did not limit the interaction between particles to 
mechanical manipulations, and his understanding of chemical properties and 
observations of the body led him to conceive of matter as chemical and active, 
                                                 
85 Willis 1683, ch. V, p. 29. Interestingly, Harvey also, when reflecting in De Generatione 
Animalium on the ‘epigenesis’ of the chicken embryo out of the blood, has the soul “reside” in 
the blood: “The blood is . . . the author and preserver of the body and the principal part in 
which the soul resides” (Harvey 1651/1981, p. 247f.). 
86 Willis, Of Fermentation, chs. I-II in Willis 1659/1681. 
87 Willis, Of Feavers, ch. I, § 1, in Willis 1659/1681, p. 59 (pagination continous with Of 
Fermentation). 
88 Willis 1659/1681, ch. V, p. 13. 
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not inert.89 To conceive of matter as “meerly passive” is for him “vulgarly 
delivered”; rather, and sounding just like Gassendi: 
 
Atoms, which are the matter of sublunary things are so very 
active and self-moving, that they never stay long, but ordinarily 
stray out of one subject into another; or being shut up in the 
same, they cut forth for themselves Pores and Passages, into 
which they are Expatiated.90 
 
 In sum, Willis has a comparative anatomy project from which he also 
derives an account of cognitive function, and he has a chimiatric conception 
of life and disease which occasionally reverberates with Epicurean motifs. But 
what does he contribute to thinking on the nature, status and types of soul? In 
his overall scheme, the sensitive soul supplies impressions and ideas to the 
rational soul by means of the animal spirits, and those ideas are in turn 
ordered and utilised by the rational soul. The sensitive soul, which governs 
both life and sensorimotor functions, is in fact corporeal, while the rational 
soul is not. It is the immaterial, immortal human intellect. The former is 
sometimes governed by the latter, sometimes dependent on it, sometimes in 
conflict with it:  
 
The Corporeal Soul does not so easily obey the Rational in all 
things, not so in things to be desired, as in things to be known: 
for indeed, she being nearer to the Body, and so bearing a more 
intimate Kindness or Affinity towards the Flesh, is tied wholly 
to look to its Profit and Conservation: to the Sedulous Care of 
which Office, it is very much allured . . . 91 
 
Thus Willis finds himself dealing with perennial problems of 
‘communication’ between levels of soul: “And so as our Intellect, in these 
kinds of Metaphysical Conceptions, makes things almost wholly naked of 
matter, or carrying it self beyond every sensible Species, consider or beholds 
them wholly immaterial.”92 Indeed, when trying to shed light on the relation 
between the two souls, Willis can get quite ... metaphysical and opaque, here 
again building on “the most learned Gassendus”: “The Corporeal Soul is the 
immediate Subject of the Rational Soul, of which, as She is the Act , Perfection, 
                                                 
89 Bos 2009, p. 43. 
90 Willis 1683, ch. VI, p. 33. Gassendi in Bernier 1678, vol. V, book VI, ch. iii, e.g. pp. 407-408. 
91 Willis 1683, ch. VII, p. 43. 
92 Willis 1683, ch. VII, p. 39. 
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Complement, and Form by her self, the Rational Soul also effects the Form, 
and Acts of the humane Body.”93 
More concretely (although some historians of science do not find 
animal spirits a particularly proud moment), Willis’s theory of soul is deeply 
interlinked with his account of how the animal spirits produce sensations and 
motions, an account which depended almost entirely on his anatomical claims 
about the brain and nerves. The spirits move through the nervous system in a 
tonic motion, flowing outward from the brain and returning to it. They 
“reside in the Organs of the Senses, and are like Watchmen.”94 The motions of 
the spirits occasion sensations or natural instincts in animals, but they are also 
the corporeal basis for all human perception. The brain itself is the instrument 
that facilitated this pneumatic process. Willis’s theory of the soul thus 
emphasises the physicality of the sensitive soul in humans and animals, and 
the physical motions of these animal spirits through the nerves and brain. He 
held that the human soul was thus severely limited in its powers by the 
instruments of the brain, nerves, and animal spirits. 
The sensitive soul is produced by the normal motions of the body. As 
noted above, for Willis there are five major elements: earth, water, salt, sulfur 
and spirits. Every physical thing incorporates these elements in some form, 
with the exception of spirits – this is especially true for spirits in the body 
itself. Willis adheres to a broadly Galenic model of how spirits are distributed 
in the body, but adds his own theories reflecting contemporary anatomical 
theories of the time (including those of Harvey). Blood flows to the brain, 
where the most subtle spirits in the blood are separated from its grosser parts 
by virtue of the nerves. Willis assumes like many of his contemporaries that 
nerves are hollow, pneumatic vessels constantly filled with animal spirits, 
which he defines as the most refined variety of spirit – so refined and so 
subtle that they were the only physical thing that might possibly be moved by 
any incorporeal agent. The soul resides at the very center of the brain, 
specifically between the corpus callosum and the corpora striata, where it 
receives impressions from the flux of spirits into the brain from the external 
nerves, and can then return those spirits to the extremities to move the body 
in various ways.95 
An important aspect of Willis’s corporeal soul that falls outside the 
province of this paper is the new way in which he rendered the soul 
                                                 
93 Willis 1683, ch. VII, p. 41. 
94 Willis 1683, ch. X, p. 57. 
95 Thanks to Louis Caron for his help with Willis. The literature on Willis has by now reached 
respectable proportions; we have found Bos 2009, Bynum 1973 and Caron 2011 (chs. 1-3) 
particularly helpful. 
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accessible to psychopathology, or conversely, made mental illness an object 
that could be studied within the naturalistic framework of the new sciences 
(Conry 1978, Tabb forthcoming). This is because he produces an account of an 
immaterial soul that is “dependent on the sensitive soul for its proper 
operation, subject through this dependence to diseases which are potentially 
curable by physical methods, localised in its seat to a particular portion of the 
human brain.”96 
Our concern here is not Willis’s overall impact on thinkers of his time 
such as Locke, as one of the ‘Oxford Physiologists’, or on the later history of 
medicine and neuroscience. Instead, our primary focus is on Willis’s 
contribution to the articulation of the concept of material soul. This includes a 
willingness to look for types of soul in the context of functional anatomy (in 
contrast, say, to Descartes, for whom the pineal gland is very much a top-
down, a prioristic decision for where to locate these parts of our cognitive 
faculties), and a complex discussion of how the soul, in its corporeal part but 
not only, interacts with body, brain, and animal spirits. This is both a major 
step beyond the gradual privileging of physiology and medicine in 
metaphysical discussion over the previous centuries (discussed in Park 1988), 
and a move towards naturalisation, in the sense of a gradual blurring of the 
divide between human and animal souls. To be sure, Willis’s bracketing off of 
an immaterial, immortal soul in no way reveals a covert atheist or heterodox 
attitude on his part.97 Yet he provides, quite deliberately, a set of major 
resources for the naturalisation of the soul. We now turn to the other major 
‘set of resources’ for this project, the psychophysiology of Malebranche 
(which certainly was not a planned legacy on his part). 
 
 
5. Resources for a psychophysiology: Malebranche 
 
Nicolas de Malebranche (1638–1715) certainly considers himself in 
agreement with Descartes in terms of physiology, with the exception of the 
pineal gland. “For it must be noted that even when he [Descartes] is mistaken, 
as seems probable when he assures us that it is to the pineal gland that the soul 
is immediately united, this nevertheless could not basically invalidate his 
system, from which we shall always draw all the utility that can be expected 
from the truth.”98 Malebranche agrees with Descartes that the soul receives 
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97 See the clear corrective remarks in Henry 1989, p. 98. 
98 Malebranche 1674, II.i.1.ii, in Malebranche 1997, p. 89. 
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new ideas when new traces are imprinted on the brain and vice versa, but he 
denies that the soul considers these traces in order to sense, imagine or 
conceive of new ideas: 
 
It is not that it [the soul] considers these traces, since it has no 
knowledge of them; nor that these traces include these ideas, for 
they have no relation to them; nor, finally that the soul receives 
its ideas from these traces; for . . . it is inconceivable that the 
mind receive anything from the body and become more 
enlightened by turning toward it.99 
 
Descartes’ separation of the soul as thinking substance may have 
brought about a closer study of, and a more intimate relation with, the human 
body (discussed in the previous section), but it is Malebranche’s articulation 
of this Cartesian science of mind and animal spirits that had the most impact. 
John Yolton notes that both La Mettrie and Joseph Priestley saw Malebranche 
as apparently “the first who brought into vogue the doctrine of animal 
spirits.”100 Further, John Sutton emphasises that “reactions to ‘the Cartesian 
philosophy of the brain’ owed as much to Malebranche’s as to Descartes’ 
version.”101 Indeed, it is clear that Malebranche’s impact extended well 
beyond any mere popularisation of Descartes’ ideas, to the development of 
his own coherent and comprehensive psychophysiological account. He was 
willing to argue against aspects of Descartes’ metaphysics in order to extend 
the explanatory power of psychophysiology, with respect to cerebral and 
mental processes and localisation, and particularly regarding memory as 
‘memory traces’ imprinted in the brain.102 His account differs from Descartes 
in the following significant ways.  
First, he denies Descartes’ claim that we can have a clear and distinct 
idea of the soul, arguing that if Descartes truly had such an idea, he could 
easily discern its properties, just as he does concerning the nature of matter as 
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extension.103 The soul is distinct from the body, not because “the fact that I can 
clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another is enough to 
make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they are capable of 
being separated, at least by God,”104 but because the phenomenal features of 
our experience cannot belong to matter; they are excluded by its very 
nature.105 Defining the soul in this way allows Malebranche to be more 
equivocal (cautious?) about the soul than Descartes:  
 
It is true that we know well enough through our consciousness, 
or the inner sensation we have of ourselves, that our soul is 
something of importance. But what we know of it might be 
almost nothing compared to what it is in itself.106 
 
And he recognises that our idea of the soul is not as clear as that which we 
have of the body.107 
Malebranche’s unwillingness to follow Descartes in his idea of the soul 
reflects a more cautious attitude regarding its derivation. He does not think 
God needed to give us a clear idea of the soul in order for it to perform its 
function united with the body, nor is a clear idea of the soul necessary for it to 
be revealed to us through faith. His emphasis on more experiential and 
functional aspects of the soul such as consciousness lent itself to later, 
materialist interpretations of its nature, as found in L’âme matérielle. 
A further contribution to materialist interpretations of Malebranche’s 
psychophysiology stems from his occasionalist metaphysics. Briefly, 
occasionalism is the doctrine that restricts causation to the will of God by 
denying the causal efficacy of all finite substances, whether material or 
immaterial. Malebranche takes this further in terms of psychological 
explanation by postulating the same type of causation for all occasional 
causes. In rendering physical and mental causation equally inefficacious, he is 
not subordinating one to the other. “He takes our inability to explain mental 
causation in the terms developed for bodily causation as an illustration not of 
the fundamental difference between the two sorts of substance but as an 
illustration of our ignorance of the mind.”108 LoLordo suggests that “there is 
no clear reason why one should place demands from the science of body onto 
explanations of the mind if, like Descartes, one views the mind as an entirely 
                                                 
103 Schmaltz 1994, p. 578. 
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105 Malebranche 1674, I.x.1, in Malebranche 1997, p. 49. 
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different type of substance. There is no clear reason why a dualist should 
deny agency to the mind just because she denied it to body.”109 
Yet as with the idea of the soul, Malebranche exhibits a sort of 
intellectual caution here: he is unwilling to assume we have knowledge 
outside of what God furnishes us with for our own survival. Our knowledge 
of causation need not extend beyond our immediate experience and so he 
does not privilege one type of causation above another. There seems to be a 
dual commitment on his part: he is committed to God and has a priori 
theological justifications for a belief in the immaterial soul, but this same 
belief leads him to value the study of nature, and of the human being, as a 
study in and of itself. This emphasis on the functions and limits of the human 
being leads to a comprehensive psychophysiology that understands the 
knowledge we have of ourselves as nothing beyond what is necessary for our 
human environment.  
 
All its [the soul’s] sensations direct the soul to the preservation of its 
machine. They agitate the soul and frighten it as soon as the least 
spring is unwound or broken, and as a result the soul must be subject 
to the body as long as the body is subject to corruption.110 
 
Malebranche’s account of this preservation extends from the operation of 
reflex actions to the complexity of memory as distributed patterns of animal 
spirits in the brain, beginning from a basic description of nerve fibres: “they 
are composed of tiny filaments originating in the middle of the brain”; he has 
“reason to believe” that these nerve filaments are hollow, “like little canals,” 
and “completely filled with animal spirits, especially when one is awake; 
when the end of these filaments is disturbed, the spirits contained in them 
transmit to the brain the vibrations they have received from without.”111 He 
states later on that the soul “cannot impart movement to its body without 
animal spirits, and that it is through them that it recovers its control over the 
body.”112 Malebranche elaborates on the relation between soul and animal 
spirits several times; most relevant to our emphasis on the strongly 
naturalistic, causal flavor of his analysis is this passage:  
 
At the moment when the animal spirits are forced from the 
brain into the rest of the body to produce in it the motion 
appropriate to sustain passion, the soul is driven toward the 
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good it perceives, and the soul is the more driven as the spirits 
leave the brain with greater force because the same disturbance 
agitates the soul and the animal spirits.113 
 
And the soul is localised: “these things clearly show that the soul 
immediately resides in that part of the brain to which all the sense organs 
lead” (I.x.3, p. 50; “to which the filaments of our nerves lead,” I.x.5, p. 51). Of 
course, Malebranche introduces – not a caveat, not an argument-stopper, but 
a kind of token transcendental distinction: when he says it “resides there” 
(italics in original), he only means in the sense of a kind of awareness of what 
is occurring there (whether the action of the fibers or the reactions of the 
spirits within them); for “the soul can immediately reside only in ideas…” 
(ibid.). Later on, again in the midst of a swarm of naturalistic statements about 
the train of spirits, the mechanisms which produce ideas, and the fact that our 
sensations have to be related to our body, Malebranche again trots out a 
transcendental distinction (which in this case is mainly stipulative): “since 
ideas are spiritual, they cannot be produced from material images in the 
brain, with which they are incommensurable”; “a spiritual idea cannot be 
formed from a material substance” (III.ii.3, p. 223). 
A more explicit version of the transcendental argument is given by 
Berkeley, who appears to be targeting precisely our set of authors, described 
as “they . . . who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system 
of animal spirits,” and thereby make the soul “perishing and corruptible as 
the body.” Berkeley responds that it is “evident that bodies, of what frame or 
texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more distant 
and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness,” whereas 
 
the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is 
consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the 
motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions, which we hourly 
see befall natural bodies . . . , cannot possibly affect an active, 
simple, uncompounded substance; such a being therefore is 
indissoluble by the force of nature . . . the soul of man is naturally 
immortal.114  
 
Or, almost a hundred and fifty years earlier, in Timothie Bright’s Treatise of 
Melancholie: “the soul hath a faculty one, single and essential,” regardless of 
how many “parts are performed in the organical bodies.”115 If turn back to 
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Malebranche’s psychophysiology, it becomes hard to miss the sheer weight of 
the naturalistic rather than the transcendental side of the analysis, and indeed 
it was the former that overwhelmingly predominated in the usage of 
Malebranche in the next generations – particularly in L’âme matérielle, as 
discussed below. 
For he returns several times to the place of the soul’s “residence,” and 
adds an important theme which was present in Descartes but rather less 
overtly: that of our own physical self-preservation and survival. For the 
reason of the soul’s location in the brain is “for the maintenance and 
preservation of all the parts of our body”; that is, it needs to be aware of the 
changes occurring in the body and to distinguish “those that are agreeable to 
our body’s condition from those that are not” (I.x.5, p. 51). Curiously, 
Malebranche seems to hold that the existence of involuntary nervous 
processes which themselves are crucial to our self-preservation (such as 
blinking an eye, lifting one’s arm to ward off a blow, or reacting to a burning 
coal placed in our hand while asleep116, are “very useful for the preservation 
of the body” but “extremely dangerous for the soul.”117 On the one hand, 
sensations are key to our staying alive – to the preserving of our “machine,” 
Malebranche says (machine was commonly used to mean ‘body’ in this period 
in French); but on the other hand, they render the soul “subject to the body,” 
“they act upon the soul much more than the soul acts upon them.”118 
It is “the close union between soul and body” which both explains and 
obscures the nature of the human being; “which union prevents us from 
precisely distinguishing the properties of matter from those of mind.”119 
Despite or perhaps because of the coherence and comprehensiveness of his 
psychophysiological account, Malebranche does not make definitive claims 
about the nature of the human being. But the localisation or “residence” of the 
soul; the detailed account of how its activity relates to cerebral processes (“the 
soul can never sense anything or imagine anything anew unless these is some 
change in the fibers of this same part of the brain,” II.i.1.i, p. 88), and the 
application of these concepts to human anthropology and psychology itself 
(“it is easy enough to explain all the different characters encountered among 
the minds of men, on the one hand by the abundance and scarcity, by the 
rapidity or slowness of agitation, and by the density or lightness of the animal 
spirits, and on the other hand by the delicacy or coarseness, the moistness and 
dryness, and the malleability of the brain fibers,” II.i.1.iii, p. 89), makes for a 
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set of resources for materialism. These can be conceptual resources, but also, 
for an author of clandestine manuscripts in the early eighteenth century 
without access to the spheres of experimental natural philosophy, experimental 
ones: Malebranche had both demonstrated the need for knowledge of 
anatomy and provided some of that knowledge, referring for instance to 
Willis on arteries and cerebral anatomy.120 
To be clear, Malebranche disagrees explicitly with the Epicurean 
tradition (represented in exactly the same years as the Recherche was 
published by the physician Guillaume Lamy, in his Discours anatomiques, and 
in the next generation by anonymous texts such as L’âme matérielle, discussed 
in sections 6 and 7 below; both Lamy and the anonymous author of L’âme 
matérielle also rely on Willis, Gassendi and earlier sources). The Epicurean 
approach seeks to materialise the soul by defining it, e.g. as a special kind of fire 
or wind, a position Henry More called ‘Psychopyrism’121; Malebranche does 
not name names here but he recycles a Cartesian point that the soul can only 
be known by internal self-examination, and cannot be known via the 
mediation of any material entity like an “invisible fire” (III.i.1.iii, p. 202), 
which would be a category mistake. 
But of course L’âme matérielle will ignore these counter-claims (which 
we have termed ‘transcendental’), will retain the surprisingly detailed 
psychophysiology of nerve fibers, animal spirits and cerebral traces,122 and 
what appears to be a philosophical grounding of such descriptions: 
 
The only alliance of mind and body known to us consists in a 
natural and mutual correspondence of the soul’s thoughts with 
the brain traces, and of the soul’s emotions with the movements 
of the animal spirits123 
 
and will fuse it with precisely the Epicurean configurations of a material soul 
Malebranche sought to avoid. Put differently, the anonymous author uses a 
procedure that is typical of these manuscripts (‘patchwork’ [Thomson 2008], 
‘collage’ [Bloch 2000] , or ‘cut and paste’, etc.), and brings the Epicurean and 
Malebranchean analyses together, deliberately disregarding Malebranche’s 
stated hostility to the former.124 
                                                 
120 Malebranche 1674, II.i.4.ii, in Malebranche 1997, pp. 89, 97; Kolesnik 2011. Willis is the only 
physician named or cited in Malebranche’s enormous treatise. 
121 Henry 1987, p. 34. 
122
 L’Âme matérielle, 2003, pp. 200, 202, 234, reprising Malebranche 1674, II.i.5 and II.ii.1. 
123
 Malebranche 1674, II.i.1.i, in Malebranche 1997, p. 102. 
124 A less-known case is Bayle’s appropriation of Malebranche’s Méditations chrétiennes in a 
(paradoxical) Epicurean direction, analysed in Argaud 2009; other cases of deliberately 
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6. The material soul as “purest fire” and “subtle wind”: Lamy 
We turn now to a self-proclaimed Epicurean, Guillaume Lamy (1644-
1683), a philosopher and physician based in Paris, who received his medical 
degree in 1672 at Rouen and published his major works between the late 
1660s and the late 1670s. Lamy aroused some fierce reactions: Bayle described 
him as an “over the top Epicurean” (un épicurien outré) and Haller simply 
stated he was an “impious man.”125 
His first work, the 1669 De Principiis rerum, is an explicit piece of early 
modern Epicurean atomism, favouring Gassendi over Descartes (who was 
also viewed as a covert supporter of atomism), to show that Epicurus was 
right in the first place (although, in a gesture we will find often in works of 
this period, e.g. those of Cyrano de Bergerac, he also seeks to present these 
theories as complementary or compatible). He discusses atoms and the nature 
of matter, hesitating as to which theory he finds most convincing, but we shall 
chiefly focus on his medical-materialist approach to the soul. In De Principiis 
(I, v) and in his later works, the Discours anatomiques (1675, 2nd revised edition 
1679) and the Explication méchanique et physique des fonctions de l’âme sensitive 
(1677), with which we shall be mainly concerned, he claims that the soul and 
animal spirits are actually identical.126 The functions of the soul are identified 
(a) with the nervous centres that receive impulses from external stimuli, and 
which ensure consciousness,127 (b) with the animal spirits which carry the 
“agitation” produced by the objects to the brain, which is the “source” or 
“reservoir” of the soul (pp. 152-153) , and then return to the heart, where they 
give rise to the passions, and to the muscles (which Lamy, following Galen, 
views as the instruments of voluntary motion).128 He verbally still maintains a 
difference between the sensitive soul and the rational soul but ultimately 
locates all of these distinctions within a physiological frame. 
Chemical explanations (partly taken from Gassendi and Willis) play an 
important role here: muscular motion is explained as a kind of fermentation 
which, as we saw earlier, was a basic explanatory principle of vital processes 
                                                                                                                                            
misreading Malebranche in the service of a new naturalistic scheme are surveyed in Kolesnik 
2011. 
125 Bayle, Nouvelles de la république des lettres (March 1684), art. II, p. 32, cit. in Mothu 1990-
1991, p. 430; Haller 1774/1969, I, p. 556. 
126 Discours anatomiques, in Lamy 1996, pp. 102, 105. 
127 Explication, in Lamy 1996, pp. 142-143, 160-161. 
128 Lamy also says – unlike Galen or Willis – that the soul “flows” from the brain like rivers 
flowing through the “canals” of the nerves (pp. 153, 160, 142). 
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for Willis. Lamy has been described as a “discreet sympathiser with 
iatrochemistry,” and in his Dissertation sur l’antimoine (1682) he describes 
himself as a “Chymist” as opposed to the “Galenists,” and stresses that 
“Medicine owes a lot to chemistry.”129 
Lamy puts together Epicurean and Cartesian models deliberately (a 
synthesis which, in different forms – here, more medical, in other cases more 
focused on atomistic physics – was characteristic of a libertin intellectual and 
argumentative culture at the time, including Cyrano de Bergerac, Boyer 
d’Argens and others, and extending beyond Lamy to clandestine texts such as 
L’âme matérielle, the better-known Treatise of the Three Impostors,130 and the 
work of La Mettrie). He transposes Cartesian physiological analyses onto the 
issue of the soul, and by inquiring into the soul as a kind of substance, he 
inserts Epicurean content into these analyses. In addition, and this is also 
characteristic of libertin naturalistic thought, which is not ‘science’ but a 
programmatic naturalism,131 Lamy uses the concept of animal spirits to bind 
together these two theoretical schemas. 
Lamy’s modern editor, Anna Minerbi Belgrado, notes that the 
substantial interpretation of the soul also takes on another form in Lamy, that 
of the world soul, in a passage (itself using elements from Gassendi) which 
was taken over in different versions throughout the clandestine tradition and 
all the way to La Mettrie, as a materialist and atheist argument.132 The 
doctrine of the world soul of course allows of various interpretations, but here 
it serves an explicitly materialist purpose, in a faintly Spinozist sense given 
that it is an immanentist idea, implying that ‘soul’ is simply part of the 
material world (rather than something materialism would simply eliminate). 
An analogy with an amusing passage in d’Holbach’s Le bon sens (1774) may 
shed some light on what this means. 
 
                                                 
129 Mothu 1990-1991, p. 405 & note 338. 
130 The manuscript circulated in 1712, was printed once in 1719 and then in 1721 by Prosper 
Marchand and his friends; d’Holbach published an edition in 1777. The section which was 
known as L’esprit de Spinosa (and included the first French translation of a portion of 
Spinoza’s Ethics) is today attributed to the Dutch diplomat Johan Vroesen (as Marchand 
indicated at the time), although this is sometimes contested, and another prime candidate for 
authorship is Jean-Maximilien Lucas (Israel 2001, p. 696). 
131 For some indications as to the difference between the two in the ‘radical Enlightenment’, 
see Wolfe 2010. 
132 Lamy, VIth Discourse, in Lamy 1996, p. 104f. This is the only passage in Lamy’s work that 
will be taken over and discussed in the clandestine tradition (notably the Treatise of the Three 
Impostors, chs. XIX, XX and L’Âme matérielle, as discussed below), as well as by La Mettrie in 
his 1745 Histoire naturelle de l’âme (the revised version, entitled Traité de l’âme, appeared in 
1750: see ch. VIII, in La Mettrie 1751, p. 104), and in the Encyclopédie’s article “Âme.”  
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The material Jupiter of the Ancients could move, compose, 
destroy, and create beings similar to himself; but the God of 
modern theology is sterile. He can neither occupy any place in 
space, nor move matter, nor form a visible world, nor create 
men or gods. The metaphysical God is fit only to produce 
confusion, reveries, follies, and disputes.133 
 
The analogy would be that the material soul is not an overt denial of the 
soul’s existence but rather an affirmation of its corporeal existence, which, like 
the “material Jupiter,” allows it to interact with other entities populating the 
material world; it is not ontologically unique, yet it lives and acts, just like a 
heart, a liver or a worm in the blood. An implication that was crucial at the 
time was that this unified and immanent material world implies the greater 
proximity of animal and human souls, a danger which Bayle saw: “the natural 
consequence of this dogma is to declare that the soul of animals is of the same 
nature as that of man.”134 Out of the myriad rather murky discussions of 
human and animal souls, their relative or fundamental differences, and the 
place of rationality, mortality and other key properties therein, Bayle saw 
most sharply that when a Pomponazzi or a Lamy reduces possible functional 
variations in “animal souls” to the “variety of organs and humours alone” (p. 
104; Lamy’s definition of an animal is simply “a mixture of humours and a 
particular structure of organs”135), his argument is in fact meant to apply to 
the human soul, which only differs from that of the animal in quantitative 
terms (only “une difference du plus au moins”136). Indeed, the later Treatise of 
the Three Impostors simply states, after a ‘chimiatric’ discussion of “subtle 
spirits” and the materiality of the soul, that “this soul [is] of the same nature 
in all animals.”137 
Lamy observes, referring to Seneca, that “we all agree that we have a 
soul,” but the difficulty lies in knowing what it is: some consider it to be a 
spirit, others a harmony between the parts of the body (a view he attributes to 
Galen amongst others, but Lamy notes that Galen is not entirely clear on the 
issue), a divine infusion, a “subtle wind,” or an immaterial power.138 He then 
suggests the general distinction between the soul as incorporeal and as 
                                                 
133 D’Holbach 1774, I, § xxiii, p. 24. 
134 Bayle, “Rorarius,” remark D, in Bayle 1740, vol. 4, p. 77. 
135 Lamy, VIth Discourse, in Lamy 1996, p. 106.  
136 Bayle, “Dicéarque,” remark L, in Bayle 1740, vol. 2, p. 287; “Rorarius,” remark E, vol. 4, p. 
79 and (as noted earlier), for the formulation “du plus au moins,” the article “Péreira,” 
remark E, vol. 3, p. 652 (see Paganini 1985 on the latter formulation). 
137 1716/1904 edition, § VII, p. 99; 1768 edition, p. 85. 
138 VIth Discourse, in Lamy 1996, p. 99. 
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corporeal, and produces a rafter of arguments against the former view 
(including the perennial favourite: how could interaction take place?). Here 
we find a passage that was repeated in a number of other clandestine works, 
on the “subtle spirit” or very pure flame, and, as mentioned above, the 
“world soul”. Lamy’s adaptation and expansion of an old Epicurean motif 
served as a kind of resonance chamber for a number of radical, 
physiologically motivated, directed or influenced texts as late as La Mettrie’s 
first writings on the soul (some seventy years later), which at that point can 
seem a bit archaic, as Thomson has noted. In the passage, which we cite 
below, we find, in addition to the phrase “world soul” or “soul of the world,” 
several terms which functioned as quasi-technical terms in the period: “subtle 
spirit,” “very fine matter,” and “purest fire.” 
It is certain that there exists in the world a very subtle spirit or a 
very fine and always mobile matter, the greatest part of which 
and, so to speak the source, is in the sun, and the rest is 
distributed in all the other bodies, more or less, according to 
their nature and their consistency. It is certainly the soul of the 
world, which governs and enlivens it, and all of whose parts 
possess a portion of it. It is the purest fire in the universe, which 
does not burn of itself but, by the different movements which it 
gives to the particles of the other bodies in which it is enclosed, 
it burns and gives off heat.139 
 
And in the version which appears in the Treatise of the Three Impostors: 
 
It is certain that there is in the universe a very subtle spirit, or a 
very delicate matter, always in motion, the source of which is in 
the Sun, and the remainder is spread in all the other bodies, 
more or less, according to Nature or their consistency. That is the 
Soul of the Universe which governs and vivifies it, and of which 
some portion is distributed among all the parts that compose it. 
This Soul, and the most pure Fire which is in the universe does not 
burn of itself, but by the different movements that it gives to the 
particles of other bodies where it enters, it burns and reflects its 
heat. . . [T]his fire being enclosed in the body, it is rendered capable of 
thought, and that is what is called the soul, or what is called animal 
spirits, which are spread in all parts of the body. Now, it is certain 
that this soul being of the same nature in all animals, disperses 
at the death of man in the same manner as in other animals, 
from whence it follows that . . . the other world is a chimera . . 
.140 
                                                 
139 Lamy, VIth Discourse, in Lamy 1996, p. 104; Thomson 2008, pp. 88, 160, 170.  
140 (Anon.) 1716/1904, § VII, p. 99; (Anon.) 1768 edition, p. 85, emphasis ours. 
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As will be developed much more extensively in L’âme matérielle, which we 
discuss below, the vital flame or “most pure fire” is equated here with animal 
spirits (once we are dealing with what is “enclosed in the body”). 
 This is an ancient Hellenistic theme (found in Peripatetic, Epicurean 
and Stoic writings): human souls are not the only things in the universe that 
can be called souls, for “soul penetrates through the whole universe, and we 
by sharing in it, as a part, are ensouled.”141 Epicureans writing after Epicurus 
added some layers of detail and complexity to the account he gave in the 
Letter to Herodotus, of the soul as a kind of wind, but also a kind of heat. For 
instance, Aëtius presents the Epicurean view as distinguishing between four 
elements which make up the soul: a fire-like one, an air-like one, a wind-like 
one, and an unnamed fourth element, which is responsible for sensation 
because of its particular fineness.142 Cardano considers the view that the soul 
is a kind of “celestial heat” to be Hippocrates’ view – and a correct one.143 The 
Treatise of the Three Impostors compares Leucippus, Democritus, Hippocrates 
and Empedocles, who define the soul either strictly as a kind of flame, or as a 
combination of flame and other elements, to Epicurus, who also believes this, 
but adds “that in that composition there enters some air, a vapor, and another 
nameless substance of which is formed a very subtle spirit, which spreads 
through the body and which is called the soul.”144 Walter Charleton, another 
early modern Epicurean (although one who has his spokesperson-character in 
one work declare that “as a Christian, I detest and utterly renounce the 
doctrine of that Sect, concerning Mens Souls,” even if he is “an Epicurean, in 
many things concerning Bodies”145), also presents a description of the 
corporeal soul as “of Substance either Fiery, or merely resembling Fire; of a 
consistence most thin and subtile, not much unlike the flame of pure spirit of 
Wine, burning in a paper Lantern.”146 As we have seen, thinkers including 
Malebranche and Berkeley denounced this concept, for its implicit or explicit 
materialism.  
Briefly put, these images of ‘subtle wind’ or ‘subtle spirit’, ‘very fine 
matter’, fire or flame all convey the idea that the soul is composed of a special 
                                                 
141 Cleanthes apud Hermias, In Gent. Phil. 14 (Diels, Dox. Graec 654 [=svf 1.495]), in Annas 
1992, p. 43. 
142 Liddell-Scott frag. 14C, cit. Rapp 2006, p. 189. This is taken up and elaborated by Lucretius, 
De rerum natura, III, 262-265, 268-272. 
143 “Hippocrates correctly said, the soul is nothing but the celestial heat” (De subtilitate, 5, cit. 
in Hirai 2011, p. 111). 
144 (Anon.) 1716/1904, ch. V, § vi, p. 99; (Anon.) 1768 edition, p. 87. 
145 Charleton 1659, reprint, p. 185. 
146 Charleton 1674, pp. 5-6. 
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kind of matter. In Willis, this becomes a “subtle matter” which structures the 
body; this can be taken in an idealistic sense (thinking of Plato and Galen: the 
soul as the blueprint or ‘form’ of a substance) and in a materialistic sense 
(emphasised in anonymous treatises such as L’âme matérielle). But as regards 
the former, he is careful to distinguish his view from that of the “Soul of the 
Beast [as] an Incorporeal Substance, or Form.”147 And he is clearly committed 
to a new, chemically overdetermined concept of matter which is not “meerly 
passive” but active and self-moving.148 Gassendi also describes the soul as “a 
very tenuous substance, just like the flower of matter (flos totius materiae) with 
a special disposition, condition and symmetry holding among the crasser 
mass of the parts of the body.”149 It is a material soul, but with emergent 
properties, that are chiefly specified in chemical terms. As we will see in the 
next section, certain appropriations of the Lucretian motif that “the soul is to 
the body as scent is to incense”150 take this chemical-emergent sense one step 
further (towards materialism), by making the soul, no longer a material entity 
in its own right (whether in a humorally interactivist sense, a structural sense 
in which it teleologically orders the functioning of the body’s organs, etc.) but 
a mere emanation or effluvium of a material substructure, the body. 
 
7. L’âme matérielle 
 With the anonymous manuscript L’Âme Matérielle,151 which can be 
dated to approximately 1725-1730 based on some of its citations, we witness a 
first, and rather general programmatic attempt at the naturalisation of mental 
phenomena, that is, at locating mental phenomena within an integrated 
corporeal and cognitive scheme (the distinction between these two levels 
being both anachronistic and irrelevant here).152 Thanks to Niderst’s research, 
we know that this text is an ingenious patchwork of Spinoza via Bayle 
(particularly his article “Buridan” in the Dictionnaire, the Pensées diverses sur la 
                                                 
147 Willis 1683, ch. I, p. 4. 
148 Willis 1683, ch. VI, “Of the Science or Knowledge of Brutes,” p. 33. 
149 Gassendi, Syntagma, Pt. II, Physica, sect. I, Bk. IV, “De Principio Efficiente, seu de Causis 
Rerum,” ch. 8, in Gassendi 1658, I, p. 337a; see also Garber 1998, p. 771. 
150 “l’âme est au corps comme l’odeur à l’encens, l’un ne peut être détruit sans l’autre” (L’Âme 
matérielle, 2003, p. 174); as discussed below, this is a shorter, non-literal but more assertive 
rendition of Lucretius, De rerum natura III, 327-330. 
151 Niderst first suggested Du Marsais as the author, who is now considered to have been the 
priest Etienne Guillaume (Mori and Mothu 2003), but this has been contested (Thomson 2008, 
p. 157, who does not say why). Guillaume was the author of, amongst other texts, De la 
conduite qu’un honnête homme doit garder pendant sa vie. 
152 For further discussion of ‘clandestine’ strategies of naturalisation of the mind (including 
both L’âme matérielle and Fontenelle’s earlier Traité de la liberté de l’âme) see Wolfe 2010. 
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comète, but also the Réponse aux questions d’un provincial), Malebranche’s 
psychophysiology, the doctrine of the (material) soul as a “fiery soul” from 
Gassendi as mediated through Bernier, Epicurean physiology (particularly 
borrowed from Lamy), travel narratives, and various materialist prodromes 
from Lucretius to Vanini and Hobbes, typically using the analyses and 
summaries given in anti-materialist works. Niderst comments, rather 
interpretively, that the anonymous author, handicapped by a lack of direct 
access to the sources, wanted to refute the “enemies” of materialism using the 
passages quoted in their own attacks!153 This has an effect on the 
physiological portions of the work, since they are based on older notions such 
as the “innate fire” in the soul, and animal spirits (which by the 1720s is no 
longer exactly state-of-the-art neurophysiology), to which the author adds the 
idea of cerebral traces as a basis for memory and association. Ideas are 
nothing other than traces in the brain, which are the impressions ‘imprinted’ 
via animal spirits by the effect of objects on our external sense organs.154 
The argument for the materiality of the soul in this text has four basic 
elements:155 
(a) the predominantly Malebranchian account of animal spirits, blood 
and brain; 
(b) the rejection of the difference between animal and human souls; 
(c) mortalism, that is, the affirmation of the mortality of the soul; 
(d) an Epicuro-Lucretian element, which conveys, however 
suggestively, the idea of an emergent-materialist conception of the 
soul. 
 
(a) Materialist spirits 
As noted earlier regarding Malebranche, this is a prime case of the way 
in which clandestine manuscripts appropriate a piece of a text and leave out 
the original author’s protestations. Here, Malebranche’s account of brain 
traces is taken on board, minus his denunciation of the idea. Recall that 
Malebranche did describe various cases of mind-brain identity: the “variety 
found in men’s inclinations” depends on the “almost infinite variety found in 
the aural fibers, the blood and the spirits”; “the different characters 
encountered among the minds” can easily be explained “by the abundance 
                                                 
153 See Niderst’s introduction to his new edition of L’Âme Matérielle, pp. 13, 16-17. For further 
discussion of this text see Vartanian 1982 and Thomson 2008. 
154 L’Âme matérielle, p. 200, 202, 234. Even the Jesuit Dictionnaire de Trévoux has under “Trace” 
a sub-heading entitled “Brain Traces” (“Traces du cerveau”).  
155 Our aim is not reiterate the presence of every single possible historical source, which in 
any case has been done by Niderst over the course of the three editions he has procured of the 
text (see also Mori and Mothu 2003 for additional sources). 
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and scarcity, the rapidity or slowness of agitation, and by the density or 
lightness of the animal spirits, and . . . by the malleability of the brain fibers; 
and finally, by the relation the animal spirits might have to these 
fibers.”156 This is so true that one can even “take the soul for a certain 
configuration of the parts of the brain, and for the motion of spirits.”157 But 
Malebranche sometimes warns the reader against trusting too literally in such 
an identity: 
 
It is not enough merely to feel, or to have a vague 
understanding, that the brain traces are linked to each other, 
and are followed by movement of the animal spirits, that the 
traces aroused in the brain arouse ideas in the mind, and that 
the movements excited in the animal spirits excite passions in 
the will. It is necessary, as far as possible, to understand 
distinctly the cause of all these different connections, and 
especially the effects they are capable of producing.158 
 
and above all, 
 
It is true that there are some people stupid enough and others 
imaginative enough to constantly take the soul for a certain 
configuration of the parts of the brain, and for the motion of 
spirits… For what do we reply to a man who imagines that a desire, 
for example, is nothing but the movement of spirits; that a thought is 
but a trace or image of objects where spirits have formed in the brain; 
and that all reasonings of men consist only in the different 
placement of tiny bodies diversely arranged in the head?159 
 
 In contrast, the author of L’Âme matérielle is happy to assert as a kind of 
new, state-of-the-art physiological knowledge what Malebranche had 
declared to be the view of “stupid people”: 
 
The sense organs really act on the animal spirits . . . their action 
consist in pushing them into certain little canals rather than 
others. . . . Hence we must treat the relation between the senses 
as material or, which is the same, as a mechanical action of the 
sense organs on the animal spirits, which I consider strictly as 
the most subtle parts of the blood and other bodily fluids, and as 
                                                 
156 Malebranche 1674, I.xiii.5, in Malebranche 1997, p. 64; Malebranche 1674, II.i.1, § 3, in 
Malebranche 1997, p. 89. 
157 Malebranche 1674, VI.ii.7, § 3, in Malebranche 1997, p. 492. 
158 Malebranche 1674, II.i.5, in Malebranche 1997, p. 101. 
159 Malebranche 1674, VI.ii.7, § 3, in Malebranche 1997, p. 492, our emphasis. 
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the rarefied and highly purified essence of the various matters 
which compose the human body.160 
 
In addition, since memory is the preserving and renewing of this relation 
between the senses, it must be considered as material; memory is the 
“mechanics” of the process, formed by “material agents” (p. 230). This idea of 
the materiality of memory, the material traces of memory, is again 
Malebranchian: 
 
For it is enough that many traces were produced at the same 
time for them all to rise again together. This is because the 
animal spirits, finding the path of all the traces made at the same 
time half open, continue on them since it is easier for them to 
travel those paths than through other parts of the brain. This is 
the cause of memory and of the bodily habits we share with the 
beasts.161 
 
Or, as Kenelm Digby had put it some decades earlier: “there is no act of our 
soul, without speculation of phantasms residing in our memory.”162 When we 
have referred to the medicalisation (a more specific historically specifiable 
process) and naturalisation (a more conceptual process) of the soul, we meant 
that this was not identical with a reduction of higher-level features (mind, 
intentionality, consciousness ...) to the basic features of matter, or basic 
physics (whatever that might mean in this period). An indication of this is the 
usage here of the animal spirits concept and how it allows for a material 
account of memory and association of ideas, which can account for our 
immense capacity for memory, but also for the alteration and confusion of our 
memories. For memory is defined here as a set of inextricable connections 
between brain traces made by the flow of spirits, such that “none can be 
aroused without all those which were imprinted at the same time being 
aroused.”163  
Further, the manuscript also draws reductionist consequences from 
this psychophysiology, in the sense that our mental life is physiologically 
dependent on, and constituted by the movement of the animal spirits, and 
thus, in a separate claim (which is also characteristic of this tradition), we are 
                                                 
160 L’âme matérielle, 2003, p. 230. Malebranche also defined life in terms of blood: “man’s life 
consists only in the circulation of the blood” (Malebranche 1674, II.1.i, in Malebranche 1997, p. 
90). 
161 Malebranche 1674, II.i.5.ii, in Malebranche 1997, p. 106. 
162 Digby, The Nature and Operations of Man’s Soule, ch. X, in Digby 1645, p. 96 (the two 
treatises are printed together but paginated separately). 
163 Malebranche 1674, II.i.5.ii, in Malebranche 1997, p. 105.  
44 
 
not free: “Can man interrupt the emotions of spirits and blood, or the 
perturbations of the brain, precipitated by [external] objects? . . . Our 
happiness, wisdom and freedom are dependent on the motion of the animal 
spirits which we do not control, and these motions . . . cause the emotions in 
our soul. None of this is free, nor can it be prevented.”164 The animal spirits 
doctrine is taken in a further ‘immoralist’ direction to mean that the 
composition of our blood determines us to virtue or vice, a motif which, as we 
saw, led the surgeon Timothie Bright to warn of the dangers of blurring the 
boundaries between soul and body, and which La Mettrie will happily and 
thus scandalously reprise (Wolfe 2009).165 God cannot judge us, because our 
inclinations and acts are the effect of the movement of the animal spirits: 
“Natural inclinations are continuous impressions of the motions of animal 
spirits. We are not free . . . ; we do not have the power to love or not to love, 
and God cannot make this a crime.166 
What befalls the soul, then? What is the concept of the material soul 
articulated in a treatise entitled ... The Material Soul? The text began by stating 
that the ancients, with the exception of the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, 
denied that there was a difference between the human soul and matter – not 
vile, low, palpable matter but “matter as understood by the chemists,” i.e. 
matter with active properties such as animal spirits – yet matter which is “as 
essentially bodily and material as mud and flesh can be.”167 Further on we 
hear of various ancient authorities who also held the soul to be corporeal (pp. 
34-48). The problem of the soul and the human mind (l’esprit de l’homme) is 
one of the most difficult ones there is in philosophy; in order to know it well, 
one needs to be “well versed in anatomy,” and have “in-depth knowledge of 
our body’s machine” (p. 172), on which no one is a better source than “Father 
Malebranche” (on the brain and animal spirits168) – except that the text 
continues with a long excerpt (pasted in as it were, according to a method of 
collage which is characteristic of the clandestine manuscripts) from Lamy’s 
Discours, on the world-soul and ‘animal chemistry’, which includes the 
reference to the Lucretian image that the soul is to the body as scent is to 
incense. 
As noted, there are four basic points supporting the idea of the 
materiality of the soul here, of which we have discussed the first. We now 
                                                 
164 L’Âme Matérielle, 2003, p. 182 (cf. Malebranche 1997, V.i.4), emphasis ours. 
165 L’Âme Matérielle, 2003, p. 178. 
166 Ibid., p. 176. 
167 L’Âme Matérielle, 2003, p. 34. 
168 The text glosses on the brain and animal spirits, essentially based on Malebranche, at pp. 
190-220. 
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turn briefly to the second and third elements, before focusing more fully on 
the fourth, which is of greater relevance to our analysis – it is perhaps the 
most original part of the text (including in the way it is articulated together 
with the brain and animal spirits theme), and, again, the most explicitly 
Epicurean. 
 
(b) Animal and human souls 
The author argues that there is no inherent or metaphysical difference 
between animal souls and human souls, with texts partly taken from 
Montaigne and Bayle (and Dilly to a larger extent).169 Similarly, a parallel is 
suggested between the fact that human cognitive abilities vary, as they are 
affected by early childhood development, language acquisition, etc. (examples 
include ‘wild children’ from Poland and Borneo and the deaf and mute boy 
from Chartres), and the fact that animal cognitive abilities are also not 
uniform, especially in the absence of education (pp. 88-90), a point that will be 
made quite forcefully by La Mettrie and others with the “discovery” of the 
“orang-outang.” A faintly Spinozist point is made that if our “soul” (or mind) 
were attached to a different body, whether a less sophisticated body such as 
that of an animal or a body with more potential than ours, its abilities would 
be correspondingly affected (pp. 94-96). The Cartesian conception of animal-
machines is challenged by appealing to various descriptions of animal 
emotions, loyalty, intelligence, etc.170  
 
(c) The mortality of the soul 
The text presents a case for the mortality of the soul, and replies to 
objections against it (chapters II, IV). The author identifies ‘body’ and 
‘substance’ as bearers of properties, as substrates of change; hence the term 
‘incorporeal substance’ is a “frivolous” term, internally contradictory (p. 54). 
Also included are a series of familiar arguments against the non-locality or 
non-spatiality of the soul (pp. 68-70), familiar from Hobbes. After some 
discussion of the soul, the author employs an idea that was much discussed in 
radical journals such as the Nouvelles de la république des lettres, in the wake of 
Locke’s Essay: not just thinking matter per se but the specific insight (which 
would be popular in dissenting texts all the way to Joseph Priestley171) that 
                                                 
169 Recall Bayle’s comment in the article “Pereira,” remark E that “On ne devoit point penser 
que l’âme des bêtes et celle de l’homme différassent autrement que du plus au moins . . ., et 
par conséquent on a dû croire que la seule disposition des organes est cause” (Bayle 1740, vol. 
3, p. 652). 
170 L’âme matérielle, 2003, pp. 96-106, with more details supplied after the criticism of 
Descartes, pp. 106-122, including an elegant combination of Bayle and Lahontan on beavers.  
171 Priestley 1778, pp. xvi–xviii; Thomson 2008, pp. 223-224. 
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nothing in Scripture prevents God from having “superadded” thought, or the 
capacity of thought, to matter, such that Cartesian substance dualism is 
revealed to be a philosophical construct rather than anything either (a) 
obviously true or (b) expressing the true content of Scripture (p. 144). In 
Locke’s own words,  
 
we shall never be able to know, whether any mere material 
Being thinks, or no; it being impossible for us, by the mere 
contemplation of our own Ideas, without revelation, to discover, 
whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter 
fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and 
fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial Substance.172 
 
(d)Psychopyrism, or the Epicurean pyrotechnics of the soul 
We have encountered, both positively, in Lamy and the Treatise of the 
Three Impostors, and negatively, in Malebranche’s and Berkeley’s criticisms, 
the doctrine of the soul as a type of ‘wind’ or ‘flame’ – which Henry More 
attacked as ‘Psychopyrism’.173 Where Willis was only trying to bring together 
chemistry, anatomy and physiology to produce an integrated model of brain 
function and cognitive processes (without materialist intentions), the 
clandestine texts, including L’Âme matérielle, turn this claim that the soul is 
both like a flame, and also “formed of the most subtle parts of the blood,” into 
an explicit materialist claim: “man’s soul is material.”174 In that sense it was 
quite fair for Thomas Browne to describe the Treatise of the Three Impostors 
(chapter V of which is “On the soul”) as being written by a “villain and 
secretary of hell.”175 
L’âme matérielle brings together in a few sentences, the motif of the soul 
as a “little flame,” and Gassendi’s motif of the “flower of matter.”176 He had 
described the soul as “a very tenuous substance, just like the flower of matter 
(flos totius materiae) with a special disposition, condition and symmetry 
holding among the crasser mass of the parts of the body.”177 One can see a 
trend from Gassendi and Bernier through Willis, Lamy and now the early 
                                                 
172 Locke 1975, IV.iii.6, pp. 540-541. 
173 Henry 1987, p. 34. 
174 Lamy, VIth Discourse, in Lamy 1996, p. 104; L’Âme matérielle, 2003, p. 172 (the soul as 
flame), p. 228 (“l’âme de l’homme est matérielle”). 
175 Browne 1892, § XX, p. 44. 
176 L’Âme matérielle, 2003, pp. 174, 175. 
177 Gassendi, Syntagma, Pt. II, Physica, sect. I, Bk. IV, “De Principio Efficiente, seu de Causis 
Rerum,” ch. 8, in Gassendi 1658, I, p. 337a (see also Garber 1998, p. 771); also in Bernier 1678, 
V, book VI, ch. iii, p. 456. 
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eighteenth-century clandestine texts such as L’âme matérielle, from a chemical 
conception of Life and a differentiation of types of soul, to a materialist 
attitude in which the soul is a mere emanation or effluvium of a material 
substructure, the body – a “flower of matter.” 
More explicit yet is L’âme matérielle’s brilliant and elegant rendition of a 
passage from Lucretius (in fact, the author is using de Coutures’ translation of 
De rerum natura, which went through many editions between 1680 and 1720). 
Here, the passage becomes “the soul is to the body as scent is to incense.”178 
This is more direct than the original, which describes the bond between soul 
and body as a mutual guardianship, in which the soul is the cause of the 
body’s life; and then uses the image of scent and pieces of incense: just as one 
cannot tear the scent out of the pieces of incense, one cannot tear the (nature 
of) animus or anima, mind or soul from the body, without the whole 
dissolving.179 It is an intriguing image, because it simultaneously reduces the 
soul to a derivative, dependent feature or product of a corporeal, material 
entity – the body – and also ensures that the soul is part of the province of a 
medicalised natural philosophy (rather than denying its existence outright). 
The same idea is conveyed by Willis in an equally emergentist image, which 
he credits to Lucretius via Gassendi: “the Animal is as it were the Loom, in 
which the Yarn is the Body, and the Woof the Soul.”180 A hard-boiled, 
reductive materialist faced with such ideas might respond that here, “we no 
longer really know if we are materialising the soul or animating matter.”181 
But that is the historical reality one has to deal with, once thinkers are no 
longer invoking a Cartesian distinction between thought and extension, or the 
metaphysical specificity of the rational and free human soul, or when such 
conceptual schemes are never invoked; and it only becomes more complicated 
in the eighteenth century, with the added focus on the (material, corporeal) 
                                                 
178 “L’âme est au corps comme l’odeur à l’encens, l’un ne peut être détruit sans l’autre” 
(L’Âme matérielle, 2003, p. 174). The author is apparently using de Coutures’ translation of 
Lucretius, De rerum natura III, 327-330 (Niderst 2003, p. 60, n. 1). In the 1692 edition, the 
passage is at p. 411. It is also discussed by Gassendi in the Syntagma (in the chapter on the 
soul, Pt. II, Physica, sect. 3, membrum posterium, Bk. III, “De Anima,” ch. 2, “Qui animam 
corpoream fecerint?”, in Gassendi 1658, II, p. 249b; thanks to Delphine Bellis for helping 
locate this citation), and in the Theophrastus redivivus. 
179 “Quod genus e thuris glaebis euellere odorem / haud facile est, quin intereat natura quoque 
eius / sic animi atque animae naturam corpore toto / extrahere haut facile est, quin omnia 
dissoluantur / Implexis ita principiis ab origine prima / inter se fiunt consorti praedita uita” 
(Lucretius, De rerum natura III, 327-329, emphasis ours). 
180 Willis 1683, ch. I, p. 2. 
181 Canguilhem 1977, p. 86. 
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properties of irritability and sensitivity as intentional properties, replacing 
traditional conceptions of the soul as the ‘pilot in the ship’.182 
 
* * * 
 Both Lamy, invoking a medical Epicurean conceptual framework, and 
the author of L’âme matérielle, working with a smorgasbord of elements both 
contemporary and ancient (and often removed from their own intended 
theoretical context, like the portions of Malebranche on the brain and animal 
spirits) are articulating a concept of soul as something material. We cannot be 
more ontologically precise than the texts themselves – thus for instance it is 
difficult to decide if the material soul here is an actual structure, something 
fully corporeal or organic, or if it is an emergent property of such a structure, 
as the incense image seems to indicate. However, the relation between scent 
and incense is a classic case of a relation between secondary and primary 
qualities, itself quite at home in a mechanistic framework (but that would be 
another paper). 
L’âme matérielle speaks quite explicitly of the “materiality of the soul” 
(p. 222), uses the argument (which La Mettrie will expand on considerably, 
especially in L’Homme-Machine) that states of disease are evidence for the 
interaction of soul and body – and further, that they establish that both are 
composed of one and the same substance (p. 56), such that “the mind is 
subject to the law of all corporeal beings” (ibid.). We are also told in the last 
sentence of the treatise (p. 236) that it is the “matter of which the brain is 
composed” that thinks. But even if the soul is material, the ontological status 
of this materiality is not generic: “The human soul is material, and is made up 
of the most subtle parts of the blood” (p. 228). To use a distinction suggested 
by Wright (Wright 2000), but in a different sense from him, we can say that 
the soul as locus of mental activity is here being conceptualised both as 
substance – as a material substance subject to physical and biological laws – 
and as function – belonging to medicine in general and medicina mentis in 
particular.183  
Of course, the objection made by Malebranche and others down to 
Kant (who insisted contra Soemmerring that one had to distinguish between 
                                                 
182 On sensitivity (sensibility) and irritability as properties of matter in the eighteenth century 
see Wolfe forthcoming 2013. 
183 On the naturalisation of the soul as ‘substance’ or as ‘function’, see Vartanian 1982 and 
Wright 2000; on the ontologically neutral aspect of this naturalisation, Hatfield 1995, pp.188, 
191. Vartanian comments usefully that “if one conceives of the soul as the effect or function as 
certain structures of organised matter, it is inevitable that the more legitimate articulation of 
such a concept occurs through the progress of knowledge regarding anatomical structures 
themselves, and their modes of operation” (Vartanian 1982, pp. 159-160). 
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the ‘seat of the soul’ and the ‘seat of the organ of the soul’)184, that there is a 
category mistake being made (with dangerous consequences, moral and 
other) when one allows for the medicalisation of the category of soul is – not 
logically refuted here, but rendered practically inert, as is also apparent in the 
popularity of the concept of soul as a ‘heuristic’ in early localisationist 
neuroscience. To be precise, one can either deny the very possibility of 
localisation (as Henry More did explicitly; Henry 1989, pp. 100-101), be 
‘agnostic ‘or ‘functionalist’ on the issue (like Malebranche), claim to have 
localised and materialised the soul, or present it as a functional property of a 
particular arrangement of matter (“the most subtle parts of the blood,” “the 
flower of matter,” etc.). The latter two perspectives reflect a tension between 
models of the materialist soul – not between Epicurean and other models, but 
within Epicureanism, where the soul is alternatively conceived, to speak 
formulaically, as a kind of substance or as the effect of a kind of substance. 
The final historical episode we examine is an explicit outgrowth of the 
ideas surveyed in the previous sections, particularly Lamy and L’âme 
matérielle. A notable difference is that whereas the latter texts blur genres 
without self-consciously defining a genre, materialists such as La Mettrie and 
Diderot are self-conscious, both in defining themselves as as such (La Mettrie 
is the first recorded author to describe himself as a materialist185), and in using 
medical arguments in support of naturalistic philosophical positions.  
 
8. Materialism and the soul’s remainder: La Mettrie and Diderot 
The question of the soul is approached in various ways within the 
materialist context. As noted, with thinkers such as Julien Offray de La 
Mettrie (1709-1751) and Denis Diderot (1713-1784) in the mid-eighteenth 
century, we are dealing with an intellectual context that is significantly 
influenced by the Epicurean and more generally heterodox traditions we have 
been discussing. La Mettrie himself changes his view on the soul, as Ann 
Thomson has noted; he changes – both in his revision of his 1745 Histoire 
naturelle de l’âme to the 1750 Traité de l’âme, and in his move from the work on 
the soul to L’Homme-Machine in 1748 – from a more Epicurean view of a “fiery 
soul” (à la Lamy) to a model we would more immediately recognise as 
materialist, in which thought is the emergent property of the material 
                                                 
184 As late as the 1790s, the anatomist Samuel Thomas Soemmerring decided that the 
cerebrospinal fluid (fluid of the brain cavity) was the locus of the sensorium commune, and 
decided to locate the soul there. For Kant’s attack on Soemmering, see Hagner 1992, p. 9. 
185 The term ‘materialist’ is used – pejoratively, but in the sense we would recognise today – 
by Henry More in the 1660s, in English, and by around 1700 by Leibniz in French (although 
earlier occurrences have been found in the previous decades). See Bloch 1995. 
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arrangement of the brain.186 But as we have seen earlier, even within the 
Epicurean tradition, both of these views exist: a fully substantivalist view of 
soul in material terms, and a reductionist view which makes soul, if it exists at 
all, a functional property of a particular material arrangement. 
 More interesting to us is that this shift can also be seen in broader 
terms as a shift within reductionist strategies, which we can also classify as 
types of reduction. 
There is the classic, full-scale reductionist approach, which might be 
most familiar to a modern reader. This can vary from La Mettrie’s “s/he who 
wishes to know the properties of the soul must first search for those which 
manifest themselves clearly in the body”187 (which, one may notice, is not a 
statement that there is no such thing as the soul, but rather the advice to start 
with the body), to hard-line denials, such as the dismissive comment in the 
article “Physiologie” in the Encyclopédie: “If the body is healed, one need not 
worry about the soul.”188 Or La Mettrie himself: “The soul is just a pointless 
term of which we have no idea and which a good mind should only use to 
refer to that part of us which thinks.”189 In this case, soul is being reconstrued 
as a functional definition: it is neither eliminated in favour of a hypothetical 
‘basic physics’ or the properties of matter in general, nor asserted as unique in 
its own right. But more often, in this type of reduction we find either (a) the 
weaker denial that the soul could be relevant at all to medicine, as in 
Ménuret’s statement we discussed earlier, that the soul is not “based on any 
medical observation; hence we will . . . restrict ourselves to describing the 
changes of the body,”190 or (b) a stronger denial that there is no such thing, 
period, as in d’Holbach: 
 
You speak of your soul but do you know what a soul is? Can’t 
you see that this soul is merely the assemblage of your organs, 
from which life results? Would you then deny a soul to other 
animals, who live, think, judge, and compare, like you; who 
seek pleasure, and avoid pain, like you; and who often have 
organs, which serve them better than yours do?191 
 
                                                 
186 Thomson 2008, p. 188. This change does not prevent La Mettrie from being an Epicurean in 
a very thoroughgoing sense, both in his medical materialism and in his hedonistic ethics 
(Wolfe 2009). 
187 Traité de l’âme, ch. I, in La Mettrie 1751, p. 86. 
188 (Rather loosely rendering “Qui a guéri le corps, ne doit pas s’inquiéter de l’âme” ; 
“Physiologie,” 1765, p. 538a). 
189 La Mettrie 1751, p. 54; La Mettrie 1960, p. 180. 
190 Ménuret de Chambaud 1765/1966, p. 718b. 
191 D’Holbach 1774, I, XCIV, p. 92. 
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Sometimes this hard-line denial of the soul forgoes the polemical tone and 
turns wholly instrumental, as in Maupertuis’ project of “modifying the soul” 
by administering drugs. Maupertuis, the Secretary of the Berlin Academy of 
Sciences in the mid-eighteenth century, proposed, using a rather odd term, 
that “metaphysical experiments” (expériences métaphysiques) be carried out to 
“modify the soul,” by chemically altering mental states:  
 
Might we not find here the art of producing dreams? Opium 
usually fills the mind with agreeable images; greater wonders 
yet are spoken of, concerning certain beverages of the Indies . . . 
There may be other means still, to modify the soul.192 
 
Clearly here ‘soul’ is a functional, material category, not one half of a dualist 
pair. Qua functional entity, the soul can be defined by the materialist as a 
term we “should only use to refer to that part of us which thinks” (La 
Mettrie), or as a “modifiable,” manipulable entity (Maupertuis). A locus of 
cognitive functions which has been so thoroughly naturalised that it is open 
to manipulation is, of course, rather like ‘mind’ from the psychologist’s point 
of view, something Lamy casually points to when he says “I used the words 
soul and mind interchangeably . . . because they are the same thing.”193 
But it is also possible for the materialist to be less overtly 
confrontational towards the concept of soul. Either because it has been 
naturalised, including through its reconfiguration in a medical tradition (be it 
Aristotelian-Averroist, Galenic-humoral, post-Cartesian or Epicurean); in that 
case the soul can be treated, La Mettrie suggests, as 
 
but a principle of motion or a material and sensible part of the 
brain, which can be regarded without fear of error as the 
mainspring (ressort) of the whole machine, which visibly 
influences all the other [springs], and seems indeed to have been 
made first, so that all the other parts are but a kind of emanation 
from the brain.194 
 
A material and sensible part, a spring – albeit a special, particularly 
foundational spring within the workings of the overall corporeal machine – 
and one which is located in the brain. Here, as in Diderot, the status of the 
soul is displaced away from metaphysics towards the particular case of the 
                                                 
192 Maupertuis, Lettres sur le progrès des sciences (1752), in Maupertuis 1768/1967, vol. II, p. 426. 
193 Lamy, Explication, ch. VII (conclusion), in Lamy 1996, p. 176. He adds, in a rather archaic-
sounding technical flourish, that he is using ‘mind’ primarily for “the portion of the Soul 
contained in the nerves,” and ‘soul’ for the “spirits contained in the brain” (ibid.). 
194 La Mettrie 1751, p. 63 / La Mettrie 1960, p. 186. 
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brain.195 La Mettrie also recasts the soul as a kind of complex mechanism, or 
mechanistically specifiable force, in a dense comment which is partly a 
respectful criticism of Willis and the anatomist Claude Perrault: 
 
Willis and Perrault, minds of a more feeble stamp, but careful 
observers of nature . . . seem to have preferred to suppose a soul 
generally extended over the whole body, instead of the principle 
which we are describing. But according to this hypothesis 
(which was that of Virgil and of all Epicureans, a hypothesis 
which the case (histoire) of the polyp might seem at first sight to 
favor), the movements which go on after the death of the subject 
in which they inhere are due to a remnant of soul (reste d’âme) still 
maintained by the parts that contract, though, from the moment 
of death, these are not irritated by the blood and spirits. Whence 
it may be seen that these writers, whose solid works easily 
eclipse all philosophic fables, are deceived only in the manner of 
those who have endowed matter with the faculty of thinking. I 
mean to say, by having expressed themselves badly in obscure 
and meaningless terms. Indeed, what is this remnant of a soul, if 
it is not the “motive force” of the Leibnizians . . ., which 
however Perrault in particular has really foreseen.196 
 
First, we are told that an Epicurean “hypothesis” of a ‘residual soul’ or a 
“remainder of the soul” dispersed in the body, is not quite correct (and La 
Mettrie had entertained more such views in his earlier work). Second, which 
complicates matters considerably, we are told that this hypothesis is akin – 
methodologically? – to that according to which matter can think, i.e. the core 
materialist hypothesis.197 But in any case, his third point is that this “remnant” 
is like motive force – in other words, nothing supernatural, nothing immortal 
or immaterial; a natural function. 
 However, the materialist approach to the soul discussed here, 
inasmuch as it partly reflects the early modern Epicurean context (whether 
                                                 
195
 Diderot’s late Eléments de physiologie, as well as his supplementary remarks in the 
Encyclopédie article “Âme,” stress both the complexity of the brain for any reductionist 
materialist project, and the ‘displacement’ of the soul therein.  
196 La Mettrie 1751, pp. 66-67 / La Mettrie 1960, p. 188, emphasis ours. 
197
 At the beginning of the book, La Mettrie had addressed the claim that matter can think, 
and instead of coming out for or against it, he stripped the claim of some of its incendiary 
character, and proposed the analogy between matter being able to think, and matter being 
able to tell time (La Mettrie 1751, p. 9 / La Mettrie 1960, p. 150). This is actually a somewhat 
mysterious analogy which may simply be addressing how the functional properties of 
different material systems, differ accordingly: thought for the brain, time-telling for watches 
and clocks. This implies that La Mettrie could also actually be agreeing with the view – i.e., 
that the “remnant of soul” hypothesis is like the thinking matter hypothesis, which he had 
subtly endorsed at the beginning of his book. 
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this is viewed as archaic or not), remains an embodied approach – which is 
partly reflected in La Mettrie’s rather surprising choice of the case of the 
polyp as further illustration of a “remnant of soul”: the polyp’s capacity to 
live in seccated forms implies that there is no central soul but rather a 
principle of animation dispersed throughout the body.198 Put differently, the 
concept of the body which is at work in these materialist texts is, if not 
‘ensouled’, certainly animated and vitalised, as in this remark of Diderot’s: 
 
Whatever idea we initially have of [the soul], it is necessarily a 
mobile, extended, sensitive and composite entity. It grows tired 
just like the body, it rests like the body, it loses its control over 
the body just as the body loses its control over the soul. . . . Is the 
soul gay, sad, angry, tender, shy, lustful? It is nothing without 
the body.199 
 
Even when La Mettrie is at his most reductionist, he speaks of soul and body 
as “correlative” (“the various states of the soul are always correlative with 
those of the body”200), although when he tries to describe mutual limitation it 
does not sound so symmetrical: “nothing is as limited as the empire of the 
soul over the body, nothing so extended as the empire of the body over the 
soul.”201 
Ultimately, whether these forms of reduction are weak or strong, 
coherent or wavering, they do not reduce the soul to matter in motion, or to 
inanimate atoms. When Diderot, in his commentary on Franz Hemsterhuis’ 
1772 Lettre sur l’homme, writes “wherever I read soul I replace it with man or 
animal,”202 he is encapsulating in a phrase a process of conceptual 
crystallisation we have been following in the previous sections. It is both a 
medicalisation of metaphysics, in the sense that medical knowledge and 
observation are allowed to modify metaphysical claims,203 and – partly due to 
this specifically medical context – a reduction to body: “the action of the soul 
on the body is the action of one part of the body on another, and the action of 
                                                 
198 Antoine-Martin Roche, in his 1759 Traité de la nature de l'âme, et de l'origine de ses 
connoissances. Contre le système de Mr. Locke & ses partisans, distinguishes between two 
materialist views of the soul, a ‘Spinozist’ view according to which the soul is coextensive 
with the entire body, and a ‘materialist’ view according to which it is just material per se 
(discussed in Yolton 1987, p. 90f.). La Mettrie’s usage of the example of the polyp here would 
be a prime case of the first. 
199 Éléments de physiologie, in Diderot 1975-, XVII, p. 334. 
200 La Mettrie 1751, p. 22 / La Mettrie 1960, p. 158. 
201 La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, ch. XII, § 2, in La Mettrie 1751, p. 155.  
202 Hemsterhuis / Diderot 1772/1964, p. 277. 
203
 A process we have traced back as far as the reception of Aristotelian natural philosophy 
and the emergence of humoralism, both in the sixteenth century. 
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the body on the soul is again that of one part of the body on another”204 
(Diderot again). 
It is not just, as we argued in earlier sections, that medical debates are 
relevant to thinking about the soul. They also have an impact on the 
philosophically specific positions taken (whether as specifically medical 
approaches to body-soul relations, as in Boerhaave, Gaub, Cullen or Le 
Camus, or as deliberate syntheses of medicine and philosophy, as in Lamy or 
L’âme matérielle). The specifically medical flavour of the materialism we see 
here – which is also Epicurean – means that its reductionism is a reduction to 
body. Conversely, that these thinkers are materialists, and committed to a 
reductionist program, distinguishes them from other complex cases of the 
blending of medicine and metaphysics (such as Glisson).205 But, as Willis 
stressed following Gassendi, the type of matter that is at issue here is not 
“meerly passive”: it is not the brutish matter, “lacking action, sentiment or 
any intelligence . . . the most vile of beings,” which apologeticists tended to 
portray it as.206 
This specifically medical materialism is a materialism of fluids, affects, 
and spirits; it is humoralist, Epicurean and chimiatric, amongst other elements 
which compose it. In that sense, the material soul concept(s) as presented here 
show that materialists are not “merchants of vanishing” (Sutton and Tribble 
forthcoming). But what is its posterity? Diderot in his late manuscript on 
‘physiology’ and its conceptual ramifications imagines what he calls a 
“physical medicine”: since “every sensation and every affection is corporeal, 
it follows that there is a physical medicine which is equally applicable to the 
body and the soul.”207 It is not clear what exactly this “physical medicine” 
might be (Rey 2000 suggests it would be more organismic, less reductive), but 
it hints (as does Le Camus with less philosophical sophistication) at the 
emergence of a scientific psychology – at a naturalisation of mental 
phenomena and beyond, which is quantitative and experimental (considering 
the role of poisons and hallucinogens, the organic dimensions of mental 
illness, and so on), and at the same time is squarely focused on an embodied, 
non-abstract type of consequence: “That the mind possesses such a corporeal 
nature need not be feared as a blow to our self-esteem” (La Mettrie 1747, p. 
111). 
                                                 
204 Éléments de physiologie, in Diderot 1975-, XVII, pp. 334-335. 
205 On Glisson in this context, see Henry 1987 and Giglioni 2008. On how an Epicurean 
medical context produces a uniquely embodied form of reductionism, see Wolfe 2009 (on La 
Mettrie) and Wolfe 2012a (more generally). 
206 Denesle 1765, I, pp. 32-33, note a, and p. 90. 
207 Diderot 1975-, vol. XVII, p. 512. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
We hope to have shown that the concept of material soul is neither 
reducible to a series of “confusions or contaminations between notions of 
spiritus, pneuma, and anima,”208 nor a kind of archaic remainder which 
gradually vanishes with the emergence of physiology after Haller in the later 
eighteenth century. Granted, from the standpoint of history of science, it 
should be construed as just that – after all, it is hard to build a scientific 
psychology on “subtle winds,” humours or animal spirits, and it is not even 
necessary to make an ontological commitment to materialism: “no one 
bothered to tell the early practitioners of natural scientific psychology that 
they had to be materialists in order to be natural scientific psychologists. In 
point of fact, of all the major eighteenth-century authors who made 
contributions to the development of psychology, only Erasmus Darwin 
allowed that mind might be material.”209 
But it would be absurd to judge Lamy, Malebranche, La Mettrie or 
L’âme matérielle as way stations between Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul and 
faculty psychology (or rather, the emergence of experimental psychology in 
the nineteenth century). What they are (making an exception for the Oratorian 
Malebranche who would be unhappy to be presented as a fellow-traveller of 
materialism), aside from fascinating documents of intellectual history, or 
exemplars of the Radical Enlightenment, are crucial episodes in the 
articulation of materialism and the soul understood as the locus of mental 
processes – not just in a restricted sense in which they would be part of a 
family of early modern materialist theories like Hobbes’s or d’Holbach’s. 
Rather, as we have emphasised, they are outgrowths of an Epicurean 
tradition which is closely interlinked with a medicalised approach to natural 
philosophy: they present an embodied, humoral materialism, in which “the 
human soul is material, and is made up of the most subtle parts of the blood” 
(L’Âme matérielle, p. 228); a “flower of matter,” as Gassendi put it. 
The presence of these citations as motifs at the heart of the early 
modern Epicurean vision of the material soul does indeed seem to be a far cry 
from the history of medicine. Indeed, Lamy’s contribution has been judged to 
be “a rather literary brand of medicine, overall.”210 But this materialism of 
                                                 
208 Henry 1987, p. 23 (reprising a point made in Walker 1984). 
209 Hatfield 1995, p. 217. 
210 Bloch 1992, p. 79. 
56 
 
animal spirits and humours is unique in its embodied character: neither a crude 
mechanistic materialism in which matter is “meerly passive” (Willis)211 (since 
if we treat matter as merely possessing the properties of “solidity, inertness, or 
sluggishness,” we can then, as Priestley saw, only “derive . . . from this 
circumstance [its] baseness and imperfection”212) nor an idealism in which Life 
is entirely the immaterial life of the soul, as it might have been for Ralph 
Cudworth or Henry More. And this uniquely embodied character stems 
primarily from the medical context.  
That the view described here is sometimes called Spinozist (aside from 
opprobrium, which is not our concern) is intriguing, given that nowhere in 
Spinoza is there any kind of ‘biologistic’ or ‘embodied’ emphasis on living 
beings as possessed of a unique set of properties or powers. But clearly, in the 
eighteenth century, there was a kind of ready-made Spinozism which seemed 
to be a philosophy tailor-made to the developments in the life sciences 
(Ibrahim 1990), whether or not it was fair to accuse, say, Boerhaave of 
Spinozism, or whether La Mettrie is a Spinozist in the restrictive sense 
defined by extensive acquaintance with Spinoza’s system. Abbot Tandeau de 
Saint-Nicolas, writing against La Mettrie in 1745, presents Epicureanism and 
Spinozism as the two possible forms of the abhorrent vision called 
materialism: matter and mechanism producing animate bodies, or cosmic 
determinism and the eternity of the world; but curiously, he diagnoses La 
Mettrie as falling into the second category rather than the first.213 As noted 
earlier, Antoine-Martin Roche’s 1759 critique of Locke and materialism makes 
a more apt distinction between two materialist views of the soul, a ‘Spinozist’ 
view (the soul is coextensive with the entire body), and a ‘materialist’ view 
(the soul is material per se). And Roche responds with a traditional invocation, 
both of the soul’s indivisibility, and of its inherent ‘inwardness’ (“sentiment 
intérieur”214), targeting Le Camus and other physicians who sought to articulate a 
‘medicine of the mind’. 
                                                 
211 Willis 1683, ch. VI, p. 33. 
212 Priestley, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit (1777), in Priestley 1972, vol. 3, p. 230.  
213 Tandeau de Saint-Nicolas 1745, pp. 15-16, 17. 
214 For Malebranche, too, we cannot have a clear idea of our soul, but only a “conscience ou 
sentiment intérieur” (“inner sensation,” Malebranche 1674, 11th Elucidation, in Malebranche 
1997, p. 552); a phrase which can be explained thus: “The consciousness of one’s existence, this 
inner sensation which constitutes the self, is composed in us of the sensation of our present 
existence and the memory of our past existence” (Buffon 1753, p. 51). But this can also be 
turned around into a statement of materialism, locating the soul in an integrated physiology 
or ‘medicine of the mind’; even Lamy repeats that “the soul, which knows all things, does not 
know itself” (Lamy, Discours anatomiques, VI, in Lamy 1996, p. 95); there may be a limit to 
first-person knowledge! 
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A question then is, what kind of materialism are we dealing with here? 
Clearly, the concept of matter at issue in these texts, at least from Gassendi 
and Willis onwards, is one which is heavily laden with chemical properties. 
Similarly, the specifically medical and thus embodied character of the soul 
appears with increasing force, from Boerhaave and Gaub to Ménuret and 
Diderot, with frequent invocations of Galen’s provocative claim that the soul 
is just the “mixture of the body” (Galen 1997, pp. 153, 157).215 What may seem 
difficult to imagine for a reader of the post-Rylean era, is that a defence of a 
certain concept of soul is also an overt humoral reductionism, understood in a 
broad sense as a reduction to the substances of which the body is composed, 
its “mixture” but also its structure. But what conclusions can be drawn from 
this specificity? A methodological point concerning the history of philosophy 
and intellectual history, and a conceptual point concerning the very idea of 
the material soul. 
Methodologically, the trajectory we have sought to describe indicates 
that there is a history, not just of materialist philosophies (Lucretius, Hobbes, 
Diderot, Priestley) but also of the presence of materialist ‘components’ or 
articulated wholes within philosophical systems that are not themselves 
materialistic: Descartes as appropriated by Regius, Malebranche as 
appropriated by L’âme matérielle, Spinoza and Bayle as appropriated by 
several generations of radical eighteenth-century thinkers – not to mention 
‘scientific’ texts like those of Willis, Whytt or Haller, whose authors go out of 
their way to reject materialism, but who instantly become evidence for that 
view.216 This is not just a theoretical game (collage, appropriation, etc.), for as 
noted with respect to Malebranche’s psychophysiology, sometimes the texts 
which were criticising a view could serve as the best evidential resource for 
an author who was not part of an inner sanctum of experimental natural 
philosophy.217 
As to the material soul itself, it shows that the concept of soul is 
naturalised without being entirely eliminated: there is a productivity of the 
concept of material soul, once it becomes “wherever I read soul I replace it 
with man or animal.”218 This is an approach to body-soul or body-mind union 
                                                 
215 One of us discusses the ‘embodied’ aspect in more detail in Wolfe 2012a. 
216 For more discussion of the methodological niceties involved in approaching the history of 
materialism, see Bloch 1995; Aury and Wolfe 2008. 
217 Thus Diderot in his writings on physiology can cite as evidence Robert Whytt’s 
‘neuropneumatological’ assertion that “the soul is equally present in the extremities of the 
nerves through the whole body as in the brain” (Whytt 1768, p. 287) even though Whytt had 
specified this was not tantamount to materialism, since these functions of the soul are 
themselves dependent on an “active sentient principle” which brought together sensibility 
and life, and could not be a property of matter itself (ibid., p. 128). 
218 Diderot, in Hemsterhuis / Diderot 1772/1964, p. 277. 
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which is neither Cartesian nor Spinozist, neither squarely reductionist in a 
standard sense nor ‘supervenient’ or ‘emergentist’ in the sense of an 
insistence on the autonomy and/or ontological specificity of mental 
phenomena. That the soul is ‘materialised’ does not mean it is folded into a 
mechanistic ontology,219 as would be the case in a materialist approach taken 
by “merchants of vanishing.” Rather than be content with asserting a 
flattened-out ontology in which there are only masses of matter in motion, 
atoms, molecules, and other merely aggregative relations of piles of matter, 
shouldn’t intelligent materialists – to borrow an expression from Deleuze220 – 
take up the challenge of conceptualising material souls? 
                                                 
219 Which also implies we are following a more ‘Epicurean’ than ‘post-Cartesian’ line, 
inasmuch as Vartanian’s distinctions are applicable (although if we consider Malebranche’s 
psychophysiology, or the multiple lines of fracture between Epicureanism and Spinozism 
suggested by interpreters of the period, the distinction loses its sharpness). For more on the 
chimiatric context of the material soul concept in Lamy et al. and how this distances the 
concept from mechanism, see Mothu 1990-1991, p. 390; on the implications of the Epicurean 
context, Wright 1991a; on La Mettrie’s way of combining Epicurean and Cartesian elements, 
see Wolfe 2004. 
220 Deleuze 1990, p. 257. 
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